Giving power to national parliaments is a common theme of EU reform. Expanding the power of the European Parliament, it's argued, has failed as can be seen from declining turnout. I don't buy the turnout theory, largely for the reasons Jon Worth has argued over at the LSE blog: there hasn't been a link between the European elections and the policy direction of the EU, never mind the people who run it, making the influence of the EP and the importance of the elections rather nebulous - and hardly exciting for citizens. It wasn't until Juncker was elected Commission President by the EP on the basis of the Spitzenkandidaten and election campaigns that the elections showed their true value, and we have to wait until the next election to see if the Europarty primaries and the campaigns generally come under greater scrutiny for their policy platforms.
The low turnout argument has led to some arguing that the EP should be replaced by the original assembly of national parliamentarians, or that there should be an upper chamber of national parliamentarians. But this wouldn't increase the legitimacy of the EU. The idea that national MPs would return home to discuss European decisions that have no bearing on their re-election clearly has no traction. Frankly, the hope here is that national MPs will socialise themselves into being more pro-European and this will tone down the anti-EU rhetoric at home - but European decisions are too political now not to have a direct democratic input. This is no solution for boosting EU legitimacy.
What about giving the national parliaments a red card power to block EU legislation? This idea has more merit, but to me it's coming at the question from the wrong angle. A system where you can block a lot, but where it's hard to make any decisions that are effective or that people can be happy with loses legitimacy simply by not working very well. By contrast, simple and direct democratic controls would give citizens a more direct route to the EU - compare the old way of picking the Commission President. Technically, it's still there - there's an election, the European Council considers the outcome and nominates a candidate that the European Parliament votes on. How is any voter going to engage in the elections based on that? But now that the winning candidate (with a majority in the Parliament) will be elected, it's a lot simpler and potentially more engaging.
It's the same with a blocking vote for national parliaments - it could prevent unpopular legislation, but it could also block solution-finding and decision-making so much that voters can't see how they can influence any outcome that they actually want. Which is why there needs to be a democratic European forum for European decisions.
But that doesn't mean that the national parliaments shouldn't have a bigger role at a European level. By building on the Yellow Card process, real substance could be given to subsidiarity. What decisions should be taken at what level is a political question that can't really be decided judicially, so it's up to national parliaments to help define what should be done at the national and European levels. But as Kosmopolito points out, the Yellow Card process is hardly used.
Maybe what the national parliaments need is a stronger institutional link with the EU. If they had an equivalent of the Committee of the Regions that could collate the views of national parliaments and give a joint opinion on legislation, and act as a secretariat that could help national parliaments use their Yellow Card powers more effectively. This could replace the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC), which is still a bit too informal to give the national parliaments the institutional support they need at the European level, and use IPEX as a basis. And by publishing joint opinions - or even a summary of the different opinions of national parliaments - this could give a more accessible expression of the different national positions and to the general parliamentary feeling on subsidiarity.
Of course, Member States could go further themselves and use the same system as the Danish parliament to scrutinise national ministers in the Council and give them clear mandates, but that's unlikely to be a popular idea among national governments...
Friday, 18 July 2014
Thursday, 17 July 2014
The Great British Cabinet Reshuffle
David Cameron has reshuffled his government for the last year of the parliamentary term, giving us the ministerial faces that will fight the next election. Reshuffles in themselves are generally not a major event for the European political sphere - Ireland had a government reshuffle last week, which might be of more interest to those still pondering Juncker's question of how to get elected after running an austerity government - but the UK government reshuffle has attracted some comment over the perceived Euroskeptic shift.
The last of the old Tory Europhiles, Ken Clarke, and some of the more pragmatic ministers such as Dominic Grieve and even William Hague (he of the 10 Day to Save the Pound fame) are gone. In their place is the new class of 2010, who are generally younger and more ideological. Richard Hammond, the Euroskeptic Defence Minister who publicly indicated that he would vote Out in an EU referendum unless there is enough to the reform package, is now the Foreign Secretary. The reshuffle has sparked fear in some quarters that it marks a turn for the worst that could signal the start of moves to take the UK out of the European Convention on Human Rights.
But we shouldn't get over-excited. The main focus of the reshuffle is domestic, like all other reshuffles. Promoting the younger generation of Tories is more about making the ministerial benches more diverse and slightly more gender-balanced while harnessing their zeal for the campaign. In Michael Gove's case (the highly divisive Education Minister), there has been a surprising demotion to Chief Whip (to reports of teachers celebrating in classrooms). The new cabinet is more Euroskeptic, but the focus is on the next election rather than on a big bust-up with Europe.
The next Tory manifesto will be the real test for how far the Conservatives will go. If a pledge to withdraw from the ECHR makes it into it, then we can be sure that Cameron has thrown in the towel on pretending to have a moderate European course. Membership of the ECHR is fundamental to membership of the Council of Europe and the EU, and a pledge to withdraw would indicate that Cameron himself could campaign for an Out vote. Nominating Lord Hill to be the next UK Commissioner may be a pragmatic sign (he's reported to be relatively pro-EU), but the Liberal Democrats would have had a say in moderating the government choice, so it's not exactly a clear signal. Hill is also an unknown figure with little obvious connection to a Commission portfolio, making it harder for the UK to get a good post (or harder for Juncker to reconcile with Cameron!), which could add to the narrative of Britain being sidelined in the EU.
In any case, the big fights will come after the next election, when a new cabinet would have to be formed. This reshuffle may be a Euroskeptic turn for the Conservatives, but it really doesn't tell us much new. Cameron's policy of appeasing the Euroskeptics has been heading this way for some time, and domestic political calculations are the biggest consideration here (Cameron is hardly famed for his long-termist thinking on Europe). It will be the next election manifesto that will be the true benchmark for how far Cameron is willing to go.
The last of the old Tory Europhiles, Ken Clarke, and some of the more pragmatic ministers such as Dominic Grieve and even William Hague (he of the 10 Day to Save the Pound fame) are gone. In their place is the new class of 2010, who are generally younger and more ideological. Richard Hammond, the Euroskeptic Defence Minister who publicly indicated that he would vote Out in an EU referendum unless there is enough to the reform package, is now the Foreign Secretary. The reshuffle has sparked fear in some quarters that it marks a turn for the worst that could signal the start of moves to take the UK out of the European Convention on Human Rights.
But we shouldn't get over-excited. The main focus of the reshuffle is domestic, like all other reshuffles. Promoting the younger generation of Tories is more about making the ministerial benches more diverse and slightly more gender-balanced while harnessing their zeal for the campaign. In Michael Gove's case (the highly divisive Education Minister), there has been a surprising demotion to Chief Whip (to reports of teachers celebrating in classrooms). The new cabinet is more Euroskeptic, but the focus is on the next election rather than on a big bust-up with Europe.
The next Tory manifesto will be the real test for how far the Conservatives will go. If a pledge to withdraw from the ECHR makes it into it, then we can be sure that Cameron has thrown in the towel on pretending to have a moderate European course. Membership of the ECHR is fundamental to membership of the Council of Europe and the EU, and a pledge to withdraw would indicate that Cameron himself could campaign for an Out vote. Nominating Lord Hill to be the next UK Commissioner may be a pragmatic sign (he's reported to be relatively pro-EU), but the Liberal Democrats would have had a say in moderating the government choice, so it's not exactly a clear signal. Hill is also an unknown figure with little obvious connection to a Commission portfolio, making it harder for the UK to get a good post (or harder for Juncker to reconcile with Cameron!), which could add to the narrative of Britain being sidelined in the EU.
In any case, the big fights will come after the next election, when a new cabinet would have to be formed. This reshuffle may be a Euroskeptic turn for the Conservatives, but it really doesn't tell us much new. Cameron's policy of appeasing the Euroskeptics has been heading this way for some time, and domestic political calculations are the biggest consideration here (Cameron is hardly famed for his long-termist thinking on Europe). It will be the next election manifesto that will be the true benchmark for how far Cameron is willing to go.
Wednesday, 16 July 2014
The Juncker Programme
Yesterday the European Parliament elected the EPP Spitzenkandidat to the office of Commission President, putting the seal on the shift in power between the European Council and the Parliament. In his speech before his election, Juncker set out his political guidelines for the next Commission. Titled A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change (PDF), it's a pitch for the support of his social democrat allies while sending some signals to the right on subsidiarity and "welfare tourism". The coalition pact worked - not that it was ever in any doubt - delivering 422 votes where 376 would do, giving Juncker a majority of 46.
Juncker's "New Start" gives us a new political benchmark for judging the Commission - having set the goals such as coming up with a Jobs, Growth and Investment Package within the first 3 months of his Commission, the Commission President can now be judged by his own platform. This should breathe new life into the Commission, which under Barroso has largely been reactive to the ideas of the European Council. It also makes Parliament's scrutiny of the Commission more meaningful since the political programme is based on Juncker's majority - parliamentary attacks on legislation and the Commission itself for not delivering will be a lot more meaningful where the Commission isn't simply acting as the middle man for the European Council.
So what's in this New Start?
On the economy, Juncker has stressed the need to cut debt and to stick to the Stability Pact, while looking for more investment from the European Investment Bank. It remains to be seen how much the "Jobs, Growth and Investment Package" can actually deliver, but the PES should be happy that Juncker will continue backing for the Youth Guarantee, a big campaign for them over the last 2 years. Juncker has also pledged action on the digital single market within 6 months of his mandate: on data protection negotiations, reforming telecom rules and copyright rules and simplifying the rules for online consumers. Copyright is a particularly contentious issue after SOPA in the US and ACTA in the EU, so this could be an area to watch in the future.
On industrial policy, Juncker's headline goal is for industry to make up 20% of the European economy by 2020 (up from under 16%), though there is little here by way of concrete proposals yet, and it sounds like the measures envisaged are very indirect. Juncker has put forward the idea of a Capital Markets Union to complement the Banking Union and help cut the costs for raising money on the capital markets for SMEs. When it comes to the Eurozone and future "bail-outs", it's out with the trioka and in with "social impact assessments" to complement the "fiscal sustainability assessment" - a big issue for the PES.
The trade pact with the US was a big issue in the debates, and Juncker is still a big backer of it, though he has spoken about protecting European standards. Potentially the biggest change here could be the increasing parliamentary involvement in trade negotiations if Juncker lives up to his promise of more transparency on the negotiations.
On home affairs, there will be a Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, and Juncker is calling for a Directive to combat Discrimination. There will also be a Commissioner for Migration. The "Blue Card" legislation on immigration into Europe will be reviewed, and the new Commission will look into the support the European Asylum Support Office can offer Member States and third countries. Finally Juncker showed strong support for increasing the budget of the border agency FRONTEX. Perhaps linked to concerns over migration, Juncker has said that there won't be further enlargement of the Union for another 5 years - though it's unlikely that there would be much chance of a candidate country joining in the next 5 years in any case.
Politically the rhetoric has shifted leftwards, but I think the programme is still fairly centre-right. Gone are the earlier musings on a band of European minimum wages, though Juncker supports each Member States having a minimum wage, and it is hard to see how the talk on investment will really be translated into tangible action (there is a history of European politicians pinning their hopes on the European Investment Bank to fund their plans in the absence of a sizable EU budget). And while the debt-cutting targets or mechanisms may be softened or bought under more democratic control, the rules will remain in place.
Much of the programme is still a wish-list and we still have to wait to see what the Commission actually proposes (remember, the Parliament still has to grill and vote in the next Commission over the coming months before they can get down to work), but it represents a big departure from the old State of the European Union speeches that Barroso gave. Barroso's speeches where a fairly reliable guide to the legislative proposals the Commission would make, but where usually originally a Council idea or only put forward where the Commission felt that the Council would find a proposal acceptable. This programme, and probably future Juncker speeches, will probably be more significant for not merely being a list of legislation, but part of a political programme: some legislation won't make it, but it's also an opportunity to shape the EU agenda.
This is not to say that the programme, along with yesterday's speech, is earth-shattering or even if it's the right list of policies, but the political Commission is back. And that's a good thing.
Juncker's "New Start" gives us a new political benchmark for judging the Commission - having set the goals such as coming up with a Jobs, Growth and Investment Package within the first 3 months of his Commission, the Commission President can now be judged by his own platform. This should breathe new life into the Commission, which under Barroso has largely been reactive to the ideas of the European Council. It also makes Parliament's scrutiny of the Commission more meaningful since the political programme is based on Juncker's majority - parliamentary attacks on legislation and the Commission itself for not delivering will be a lot more meaningful where the Commission isn't simply acting as the middle man for the European Council.
So what's in this New Start?
On the economy, Juncker has stressed the need to cut debt and to stick to the Stability Pact, while looking for more investment from the European Investment Bank. It remains to be seen how much the "Jobs, Growth and Investment Package" can actually deliver, but the PES should be happy that Juncker will continue backing for the Youth Guarantee, a big campaign for them over the last 2 years. Juncker has also pledged action on the digital single market within 6 months of his mandate: on data protection negotiations, reforming telecom rules and copyright rules and simplifying the rules for online consumers. Copyright is a particularly contentious issue after SOPA in the US and ACTA in the EU, so this could be an area to watch in the future.
On industrial policy, Juncker's headline goal is for industry to make up 20% of the European economy by 2020 (up from under 16%), though there is little here by way of concrete proposals yet, and it sounds like the measures envisaged are very indirect. Juncker has put forward the idea of a Capital Markets Union to complement the Banking Union and help cut the costs for raising money on the capital markets for SMEs. When it comes to the Eurozone and future "bail-outs", it's out with the trioka and in with "social impact assessments" to complement the "fiscal sustainability assessment" - a big issue for the PES.
The trade pact with the US was a big issue in the debates, and Juncker is still a big backer of it, though he has spoken about protecting European standards. Potentially the biggest change here could be the increasing parliamentary involvement in trade negotiations if Juncker lives up to his promise of more transparency on the negotiations.
On home affairs, there will be a Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, and Juncker is calling for a Directive to combat Discrimination. There will also be a Commissioner for Migration. The "Blue Card" legislation on immigration into Europe will be reviewed, and the new Commission will look into the support the European Asylum Support Office can offer Member States and third countries. Finally Juncker showed strong support for increasing the budget of the border agency FRONTEX. Perhaps linked to concerns over migration, Juncker has said that there won't be further enlargement of the Union for another 5 years - though it's unlikely that there would be much chance of a candidate country joining in the next 5 years in any case.
Politically the rhetoric has shifted leftwards, but I think the programme is still fairly centre-right. Gone are the earlier musings on a band of European minimum wages, though Juncker supports each Member States having a minimum wage, and it is hard to see how the talk on investment will really be translated into tangible action (there is a history of European politicians pinning their hopes on the European Investment Bank to fund their plans in the absence of a sizable EU budget). And while the debt-cutting targets or mechanisms may be softened or bought under more democratic control, the rules will remain in place.
Much of the programme is still a wish-list and we still have to wait to see what the Commission actually proposes (remember, the Parliament still has to grill and vote in the next Commission over the coming months before they can get down to work), but it represents a big departure from the old State of the European Union speeches that Barroso gave. Barroso's speeches where a fairly reliable guide to the legislative proposals the Commission would make, but where usually originally a Council idea or only put forward where the Commission felt that the Council would find a proposal acceptable. This programme, and probably future Juncker speeches, will probably be more significant for not merely being a list of legislation, but part of a political programme: some legislation won't make it, but it's also an opportunity to shape the EU agenda.
This is not to say that the programme, along with yesterday's speech, is earth-shattering or even if it's the right list of policies, but the political Commission is back. And that's a good thing.
Monday, 30 June 2014
Is the European Left riding high?
Coming second in the European elections was a very bad result for the centre-left across Europe: after years of austerity and the Eurocrisis, and the PES spurring the Spitzenkadidaten process, the S&D group in the Parliament are still 30 seats behind the EPP. However the need for a Grand Coalition to propel Juncker into office has provided an opening for the left, and, like the Grand Coalition in Germany, the essential status quo stance of the biggest party gives the junior partner greater scope for pushing its agenda.
This seems to be the case when it comes to important EU posts. With Juncker as Commission President, there is a domestic German deal to support Martin Schulz as Parliament president for another 2.5 years (with the EPP taking the post for the remaining half of the parliamentary term). Two of the front runners for President of the European Council and the High Representative are Helle Thorning-Schmidt (Danish PM) and Federica Mogherini (Italian Foreign Minister) - to the extent that the EPP are protesting that the PES can't have 3 of the top EU posts. Really, the PES would be wise to go for an economic post over the High Representative position: the presidency of the European Council will be important for negotiations over how the Eurozone will be run, while the PES hasn't a very strong position on European foreign policy (if one of Italy's priorities is immigration, then the Home Affairs Commissioner might be a better position to angle for).
Given the complexity of the EU system, any agreement on policy between the Member States would be hard to stick to, so it's important for the left to win offices that are relevant to their policy goals on the economy. This will be hard to do since it depends on the nominations from the Member States, the negotiations over posts, Juncker's own plans and how the candidates fair in the European Parliament vetting process. There's already plans to revisit the Eurozone budget rules and a deal to soften deficit reduction in return for reforms, so with Italy in the Council driving seat for the rest of the year it appears that the centre-left might have a window of opportunity to push for change.
In the end, however, the lack of agreement over the policy aims of the ECB or even on some form of Transfer Union will mean that the actual scope of opportunity is very narrow indeed. And the broader problems of the centre-left are deep: the fracturing of the old electoral coalition as the economy has become less industrialised, coupled with the decline of two-party politics in most Member States, has left centre-left parties in a difficult position. Uncertain about their domestic support and (to date) largely ineffectual in generating a public debate over a more socially minded Eurozone with greater fiscal firepower, any success over the next few month is in danger of being momentary.
The left in Europe still has a tough task to rebuild itself and shouldn't be seduced into believing that they're in a good position. Europe's centre-right may be more open to some centre-left ideas than you might think at first glance, and they could be well placed to continue capturing centrist and some soft centre-left votes. The centre-left needs to rediscover its voice and identity combined with a platform of reform if it wants to return a a vote - and power - winning force.
This seems to be the case when it comes to important EU posts. With Juncker as Commission President, there is a domestic German deal to support Martin Schulz as Parliament president for another 2.5 years (with the EPP taking the post for the remaining half of the parliamentary term). Two of the front runners for President of the European Council and the High Representative are Helle Thorning-Schmidt (Danish PM) and Federica Mogherini (Italian Foreign Minister) - to the extent that the EPP are protesting that the PES can't have 3 of the top EU posts. Really, the PES would be wise to go for an economic post over the High Representative position: the presidency of the European Council will be important for negotiations over how the Eurozone will be run, while the PES hasn't a very strong position on European foreign policy (if one of Italy's priorities is immigration, then the Home Affairs Commissioner might be a better position to angle for).
Given the complexity of the EU system, any agreement on policy between the Member States would be hard to stick to, so it's important for the left to win offices that are relevant to their policy goals on the economy. This will be hard to do since it depends on the nominations from the Member States, the negotiations over posts, Juncker's own plans and how the candidates fair in the European Parliament vetting process. There's already plans to revisit the Eurozone budget rules and a deal to soften deficit reduction in return for reforms, so with Italy in the Council driving seat for the rest of the year it appears that the centre-left might have a window of opportunity to push for change.
In the end, however, the lack of agreement over the policy aims of the ECB or even on some form of Transfer Union will mean that the actual scope of opportunity is very narrow indeed. And the broader problems of the centre-left are deep: the fracturing of the old electoral coalition as the economy has become less industrialised, coupled with the decline of two-party politics in most Member States, has left centre-left parties in a difficult position. Uncertain about their domestic support and (to date) largely ineffectual in generating a public debate over a more socially minded Eurozone with greater fiscal firepower, any success over the next few month is in danger of being momentary.
The left in Europe still has a tough task to rebuild itself and shouldn't be seduced into believing that they're in a good position. Europe's centre-right may be more open to some centre-left ideas than you might think at first glance, and they could be well placed to continue capturing centrist and some soft centre-left votes. The centre-left needs to rediscover its voice and identity combined with a platform of reform if it wants to return a a vote - and power - winning force.
Saturday, 28 June 2014
Centenary of the Assassination of Franz Ferdinand
Today marks 100 years since Gavrilo Princip assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, in the streets of Sarajevo. The assassination sparked a chain of events leading to the start of the First World War a month later. Austria-Hungary was set on a war with Serbia (both in response to the assassination and to shore up its security position in the Balkans), while Russia backed Serbia out of a mix of pan-Slavism and the aim of excluding Austria-Hungary from the Balkans as a sphere of influence -and through their respective alliances it became a World War.
The historical legacy of the assassination in Sarajevo itself is mixed (the BBC will broadcast a discussion of its impact on the region and nationalism later), with the different identities in Bosnia-Herzegovina divided over how history should be taught. In many ways Bosnia-Herzegovina today shows the challenges of divisive nationalism - both in the destructive effects nationalism can have in tearing apart previously peaceful communities, and in the challenging work of building a common future where people can feel comfortable in their own identities while being part of a shared space with other nationalities.
Two years ago I was in Vienna and saw the car Franz Ferdinand and his wife were in when they were shot. It was strange being so close to such a piece of history (the museum was deserted too, so it was eerily quiet), and nearby there was a poster of the declaration of war that was distributed to announce and explain the war. Both the personal tragedy of the victims of the shooting and the global tragedy of the terror of war sat close together.
The break up of Yugoslavia and the current Ukrainian crisis demonstrate that we still have a lot to learn and work on when it comes to peace, and that there are still dangers when it comes to clashing spheres of influence and nationalisms stoked in times of fear and uncertainty. A century on from the assassinations and the outbreak of war, the events are still striking in their relevance and need to be remembered.
The historical legacy of the assassination in Sarajevo itself is mixed (the BBC will broadcast a discussion of its impact on the region and nationalism later), with the different identities in Bosnia-Herzegovina divided over how history should be taught. In many ways Bosnia-Herzegovina today shows the challenges of divisive nationalism - both in the destructive effects nationalism can have in tearing apart previously peaceful communities, and in the challenging work of building a common future where people can feel comfortable in their own identities while being part of a shared space with other nationalities.
Two years ago I was in Vienna and saw the car Franz Ferdinand and his wife were in when they were shot. It was strange being so close to such a piece of history (the museum was deserted too, so it was eerily quiet), and nearby there was a poster of the declaration of war that was distributed to announce and explain the war. Both the personal tragedy of the victims of the shooting and the global tragedy of the terror of war sat close together.
The break up of Yugoslavia and the current Ukrainian crisis demonstrate that we still have a lot to learn and work on when it comes to peace, and that there are still dangers when it comes to clashing spheres of influence and nationalisms stoked in times of fear and uncertainty. A century on from the assassinations and the outbreak of war, the events are still striking in their relevance and need to be remembered.
Friday, 27 June 2014
The European Council votes: Cameron's Last Stand
The European Council will vote today on the nominee for Commission President. One month of political wrangling on from the elections, it's now certain that Jean-Claude Junker, EPP candidate, will get the nomination because of his majority in the European Parliament. Despite this, Cameron wants an official vote in the European Council rather than concede to consensus in return for some concessions.
What does Cameron get out of this? It may be a principled stand, and it also plays well to the domestic audience to not be seen giving any concessions or backing down (particularly with his backbenchers in the UK Parliament) - indeed Cameron has made this such a personal crusade that it's practically impossible for him to back down now. However, it's not likely to help Cameron's position on Europe for long: just as the 2011 veto failed to change anything and did little to help boost the Conservatives against UKIP, and being outvoted around the Council table is unlikely to inspire confidence in the plan for renegotiation.
The sight of the Swedish and Dutch governments ditching the anti-Juncker alliance also undermines the idea of some type of Northern European Alliance that the UK can be a part of, and even if it did stick together, whether it would be strong enough to push successfully for change. That's not to say that the UK couldn't build such an alliance, or that those countries don't really support (some) of the UK's aims, but the way the UK conducts its diplomacy means that the current "alliance" is really only skin-deep. At the moment Britain seems to identify countries that have a few of the same grumbles and tries to band together just on that issue - but since the EU is basically a series of endless negotiations, in an alliance you need to have strong links over several issues (otherwise allies are less likely to stick their necks out for each other). Without greater coherence and a longer-term attention, the UK becomes less useful to its allies, leading to a weaker alliance. Cameron's blundering anti-Juncker campaign has probably soured some relations and made it more difficult to get allies.
The vote might have another legacy by cracking the history of decisions by consensus. How will this filter into the decisions over other posts? In the short term we'll see a return to consensus as governments fear being isolated by a damaging vote, but the threat of a vote will increasingly hang over the Council table, where even a big country can be outvoted. There may not be more voting, but the European Council may become more majoritarian in character.
After Juncker is nominated and elected Commission President, it will be interesting to see how he will react to Britain's goals (and what job the UK's Commissioner will get!). Cameron has definitely burned all bridges there, but Juncker will still have to react to the increased Euroskeptic representation in the Parliament and the persistent left-wing discontent on the Eurozone. Getting into office is probably the easy part.
What does Cameron get out of this? It may be a principled stand, and it also plays well to the domestic audience to not be seen giving any concessions or backing down (particularly with his backbenchers in the UK Parliament) - indeed Cameron has made this such a personal crusade that it's practically impossible for him to back down now. However, it's not likely to help Cameron's position on Europe for long: just as the 2011 veto failed to change anything and did little to help boost the Conservatives against UKIP, and being outvoted around the Council table is unlikely to inspire confidence in the plan for renegotiation.
The sight of the Swedish and Dutch governments ditching the anti-Juncker alliance also undermines the idea of some type of Northern European Alliance that the UK can be a part of, and even if it did stick together, whether it would be strong enough to push successfully for change. That's not to say that the UK couldn't build such an alliance, or that those countries don't really support (some) of the UK's aims, but the way the UK conducts its diplomacy means that the current "alliance" is really only skin-deep. At the moment Britain seems to identify countries that have a few of the same grumbles and tries to band together just on that issue - but since the EU is basically a series of endless negotiations, in an alliance you need to have strong links over several issues (otherwise allies are less likely to stick their necks out for each other). Without greater coherence and a longer-term attention, the UK becomes less useful to its allies, leading to a weaker alliance. Cameron's blundering anti-Juncker campaign has probably soured some relations and made it more difficult to get allies.
The vote might have another legacy by cracking the history of decisions by consensus. How will this filter into the decisions over other posts? In the short term we'll see a return to consensus as governments fear being isolated by a damaging vote, but the threat of a vote will increasingly hang over the Council table, where even a big country can be outvoted. There may not be more voting, but the European Council may become more majoritarian in character.
After Juncker is nominated and elected Commission President, it will be interesting to see how he will react to Britain's goals (and what job the UK's Commissioner will get!). Cameron has definitely burned all bridges there, but Juncker will still have to react to the increased Euroskeptic representation in the Parliament and the persistent left-wing discontent on the Eurozone. Getting into office is probably the easy part.
Tuesday, 24 June 2014
State of the political groups
The various national political parties in the European Parliament have had until today to form political groups: by allying with parties from at least 7 other Member States with a minimum of 25 MEPs between them, they are entitled to EU funding and are in a better position to get good seats on parliamentary committees. For the mainstream groups of the Socialists and Democrats, the European People's Party, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats and the European Greens-European Free Alliance, there has been little change, with most of the movement on the right of the political spectrum.
Current group positions:
EPP: 221
S&D: 191
ECR: 68
ALDE: 67
UEL: 52
Greens: 50
EFD: 48
Non-Attached: 43
[The EP still lists 11 as "others", so they might join a political group yet and possibly change the rankings again].
The Europe of Freedom and Democracy has managed to reform. The grouping that Nigel Farage led in the last Parliament looked like it might be squeezed between the European Conservatives and Reformists and the new far-right alliance of Le Pen and Geert Wilders, but in the end enough MEPs from different countries were found. The biggest gain for the EFD was the membership of the Five Star Movement, which had been considering joining the Greens. The EFD has grown from 32 to 48 MEPs despite the change in membership (the Danish People's Party has left for the ECR) and the reduction in total EP seats, and it remains the smallest group.
The European Conservatives and Reformists have been the biggest winners from this group reshuffle. From being the fifth group in size, behind the Greens, in the last Parliament, the ECR is set to edge out the Liberals as the third biggest group (growing from 54 to 68 MEPs). This should be a big boost to its political weight in the EP, but it's unlikely that it will win the EP Presidency given the likely EPP-PES deal to take turns over the post. The ECR attracted the Eurozone-skeptic AfD and the Danish People's Party, along with a smattering of other individual MEPs. It's possible that this intake could shift the ECR in a more national-conservative direction, so while the group may be founded on a free market platform, this could start to take a back seat to concerns over free movement of people and cultural issues. This might depend on how far the AfD takes a socially conservative direction and whether it can retain a free market outlook. It will be interesting to see if the ECR will "detoxify" the Danish People's Party, or if they will toxify the ECR...
The United European Left grouping has also boosted its numbers from 35 to 52, with the Spanish party Podemos. EUObserver reports that the group is split between those that are anti-EU and those who favour more integration to solve economic and social issues (it seems that Podemos leans towards federalism). Meanwhile the Le Pen-Wilders project for a far-right alliance has failed to bring together enough MEPs from across the EU to form a political group. For now the Front National and the PVV will sit as Non-Attached.
For the EPP and S&D, little has changed. The German delegation is the largest now in the EPP and the S&D's biggest delegation will be Italian, but apart from that there doesn't seem to be any major changes. Likewise ALDE and the Greens have not had any major additions or losses in the re-shuffle - which could be seen as both groups having settled identities (any liberal/Green party that could join probably is already aligned with them).
Over this splintered Parliament it looks like Martin Schulz will re-take the President's chair as part of the coalition between the EPP and S&D. It remains to be seen if the Grand Coalition will stick together on the big issues or if it will only stay in place as a deal over the top posts.
Current group positions:
EPP: 221
S&D: 191
ECR: 68
ALDE: 67
UEL: 52
Greens: 50
EFD: 48
Non-Attached: 43
[The EP still lists 11 as "others", so they might join a political group yet and possibly change the rankings again].
The Europe of Freedom and Democracy has managed to reform. The grouping that Nigel Farage led in the last Parliament looked like it might be squeezed between the European Conservatives and Reformists and the new far-right alliance of Le Pen and Geert Wilders, but in the end enough MEPs from different countries were found. The biggest gain for the EFD was the membership of the Five Star Movement, which had been considering joining the Greens. The EFD has grown from 32 to 48 MEPs despite the change in membership (the Danish People's Party has left for the ECR) and the reduction in total EP seats, and it remains the smallest group.
The European Conservatives and Reformists have been the biggest winners from this group reshuffle. From being the fifth group in size, behind the Greens, in the last Parliament, the ECR is set to edge out the Liberals as the third biggest group (growing from 54 to 68 MEPs). This should be a big boost to its political weight in the EP, but it's unlikely that it will win the EP Presidency given the likely EPP-PES deal to take turns over the post. The ECR attracted the Eurozone-skeptic AfD and the Danish People's Party, along with a smattering of other individual MEPs. It's possible that this intake could shift the ECR in a more national-conservative direction, so while the group may be founded on a free market platform, this could start to take a back seat to concerns over free movement of people and cultural issues. This might depend on how far the AfD takes a socially conservative direction and whether it can retain a free market outlook. It will be interesting to see if the ECR will "detoxify" the Danish People's Party, or if they will toxify the ECR...
The United European Left grouping has also boosted its numbers from 35 to 52, with the Spanish party Podemos. EUObserver reports that the group is split between those that are anti-EU and those who favour more integration to solve economic and social issues (it seems that Podemos leans towards federalism). Meanwhile the Le Pen-Wilders project for a far-right alliance has failed to bring together enough MEPs from across the EU to form a political group. For now the Front National and the PVV will sit as Non-Attached.
For the EPP and S&D, little has changed. The German delegation is the largest now in the EPP and the S&D's biggest delegation will be Italian, but apart from that there doesn't seem to be any major changes. Likewise ALDE and the Greens have not had any major additions or losses in the re-shuffle - which could be seen as both groups having settled identities (any liberal/Green party that could join probably is already aligned with them).
Over this splintered Parliament it looks like Martin Schulz will re-take the President's chair as part of the coalition between the EPP and S&D. It remains to be seen if the Grand Coalition will stick together on the big issues or if it will only stay in place as a deal over the top posts.
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