Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Italian Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini are set to take two of the top EU posts: European Council President and the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs respectively. So what does this choice tell us about the EU's direction?
President Tusk
The choice of Tusk for EC President is being hailed as demonstrating the importance of Poland - and the growing integration of the new Member States within the EU (apparently former Polish PM Jerzy Buzek being President of the European Parliament back in 2009 doesn't count anymore). Politically, Tusk is part of the centre-right European People's Party and has a close relationship with Germany. But in the UK Tusk is seen as a counter-weight to Juncker's federalism; it's reported that Cameron and Tusk have agreed on the need for welfare reform within the EU despite their previous bust-up over free movement rights.
In terms of treaty-change and EU reform, having a sympathetic EC President will be worth more to Cameron than a sympathetic Commission President. As EC President, Van Rompuy was often asked to look into economic and institutional solutions to the various crises over the last 5 years, so the EC President is well placed to influence the EU's institutional direction. However issues like welfare are largely controlled by the Member States, which is why the UK can change its laws in the way it wants already, even if there isn't that much of a problem to begin with.
High Representative
Mogherini was the most controversial choice. Like her predecessor, Catherine Ashton, back in 2009, Mogherini's great political strengths are that she balances out Tusk and Juncker as a (PES) woman in one of the top EU jobs. However, while she hasn't had much more than 6 months ministerial experience, unlike Ashton, foreign policy seems to be her area of study and expertise. How good she will be in the job remains to be seen, but it is worth remembering that it's hard to really use the office to great effect during a crisis. Ashton's foreign policy achievements - apart from trying to build up the External Action Service - were mostly where she undertook unglamourous and time-consuming negotiations, such as with Iran and Serbia and Kosovo.
So when concerns were voiced over Mogherini's actions in the Russia-Ukraine crisis, we should remember that the Council has taken the lead on this - and the Iraq/Syria crisis - rather than Ashton. The High Representative has a coordinating role, and Mogherini's background and linguistic skills appear to make her better suited to the job than Ashton when she first took the post. The office needs time and hard work to build up its effectiveness: under Ashton institution-building was the priority. Mogherini will probably be a more publicly active High Representative, and could help build the credibility of the office further - depending, of course, on how good she is at bringing the Member States together.
Showing posts with label European Council. Show all posts
Showing posts with label European Council. Show all posts
Monday, 1 September 2014
Friday, 27 June 2014
The European Council votes: Cameron's Last Stand
The European Council will vote today on the nominee for Commission President. One month of political wrangling on from the elections, it's now certain that Jean-Claude Junker, EPP candidate, will get the nomination because of his majority in the European Parliament. Despite this, Cameron wants an official vote in the European Council rather than concede to consensus in return for some concessions.
What does Cameron get out of this? It may be a principled stand, and it also plays well to the domestic audience to not be seen giving any concessions or backing down (particularly with his backbenchers in the UK Parliament) - indeed Cameron has made this such a personal crusade that it's practically impossible for him to back down now. However, it's not likely to help Cameron's position on Europe for long: just as the 2011 veto failed to change anything and did little to help boost the Conservatives against UKIP, and being outvoted around the Council table is unlikely to inspire confidence in the plan for renegotiation.
The sight of the Swedish and Dutch governments ditching the anti-Juncker alliance also undermines the idea of some type of Northern European Alliance that the UK can be a part of, and even if it did stick together, whether it would be strong enough to push successfully for change. That's not to say that the UK couldn't build such an alliance, or that those countries don't really support (some) of the UK's aims, but the way the UK conducts its diplomacy means that the current "alliance" is really only skin-deep. At the moment Britain seems to identify countries that have a few of the same grumbles and tries to band together just on that issue - but since the EU is basically a series of endless negotiations, in an alliance you need to have strong links over several issues (otherwise allies are less likely to stick their necks out for each other). Without greater coherence and a longer-term attention, the UK becomes less useful to its allies, leading to a weaker alliance. Cameron's blundering anti-Juncker campaign has probably soured some relations and made it more difficult to get allies.
The vote might have another legacy by cracking the history of decisions by consensus. How will this filter into the decisions over other posts? In the short term we'll see a return to consensus as governments fear being isolated by a damaging vote, but the threat of a vote will increasingly hang over the Council table, where even a big country can be outvoted. There may not be more voting, but the European Council may become more majoritarian in character.
After Juncker is nominated and elected Commission President, it will be interesting to see how he will react to Britain's goals (and what job the UK's Commissioner will get!). Cameron has definitely burned all bridges there, but Juncker will still have to react to the increased Euroskeptic representation in the Parliament and the persistent left-wing discontent on the Eurozone. Getting into office is probably the easy part.
What does Cameron get out of this? It may be a principled stand, and it also plays well to the domestic audience to not be seen giving any concessions or backing down (particularly with his backbenchers in the UK Parliament) - indeed Cameron has made this such a personal crusade that it's practically impossible for him to back down now. However, it's not likely to help Cameron's position on Europe for long: just as the 2011 veto failed to change anything and did little to help boost the Conservatives against UKIP, and being outvoted around the Council table is unlikely to inspire confidence in the plan for renegotiation.
The sight of the Swedish and Dutch governments ditching the anti-Juncker alliance also undermines the idea of some type of Northern European Alliance that the UK can be a part of, and even if it did stick together, whether it would be strong enough to push successfully for change. That's not to say that the UK couldn't build such an alliance, or that those countries don't really support (some) of the UK's aims, but the way the UK conducts its diplomacy means that the current "alliance" is really only skin-deep. At the moment Britain seems to identify countries that have a few of the same grumbles and tries to band together just on that issue - but since the EU is basically a series of endless negotiations, in an alliance you need to have strong links over several issues (otherwise allies are less likely to stick their necks out for each other). Without greater coherence and a longer-term attention, the UK becomes less useful to its allies, leading to a weaker alliance. Cameron's blundering anti-Juncker campaign has probably soured some relations and made it more difficult to get allies.
The vote might have another legacy by cracking the history of decisions by consensus. How will this filter into the decisions over other posts? In the short term we'll see a return to consensus as governments fear being isolated by a damaging vote, but the threat of a vote will increasingly hang over the Council table, where even a big country can be outvoted. There may not be more voting, but the European Council may become more majoritarian in character.
After Juncker is nominated and elected Commission President, it will be interesting to see how he will react to Britain's goals (and what job the UK's Commissioner will get!). Cameron has definitely burned all bridges there, but Juncker will still have to react to the increased Euroskeptic representation in the Parliament and the persistent left-wing discontent on the Eurozone. Getting into office is probably the easy part.
Monday, 16 June 2014
Assessing some of the arguments against the Spitzenkandidaten
While Cameron's campaign against Juncker may be a blunder (though some national leaders may just enjoy messing about in boats), what about the arguments being made against the European Parliament essentially deciding who will be the next Commission President? This may be an institutional power struggle, but it's one being played out in the media for all the public to see (to an extent - none of us has been a fly on the, er, boat of the politiking of some of the national leaders), and the public perception matters. It was the German press that forced Merkel to publicly back Juncker, and now Cameron has written an article for publication in several Member States denouncing the process as a power-grab by the European Parliament.
So let's take a look at the arguments against the Spitzenkandidaten.
Nobody knows who he is!
Who's ever heard of Juncker? Sure, there were some head-to-head debates between Juncker and Schulz on German TV, and there was a pan-European debate between the five candidates, but very few people paid attention to that. (The European Council, by contrast, would never pick someone the public had never heard of). This attacks the democratic legitimacy of the choice. The presidential campaign didn't go as well as its supporters wanted, but it should be noted that the lack of media coverage of the candidates was the most severe in the UK (Juncker didn't campaign there like he did in other countries, and Schulz only visited Northern Ireland because the SDLP, rather than the Labour Party, is the PES party for the area).
The support for Juncker in the German media is because of the debate they had before the elections, so Juncker is seen as the legitimate winner of the elections. Likewise the "nobody knows who he is!" argument is strongest in the British media. While this argument does matter, the problem is that it cuts both ways: how will it play in Germany if the Council picked a nobody rather than Juncker, and how will it play in the UK if Juncker is picked?
The European Parliament doesn't have the right to pick the President, only the European Council does!
The European Council nominates the next Commission President, who is then put to a vote by the European Parliament, which elects the president (later on the Parliament also votes on the Commission as a whole). This argument focuses on the legal position and powers of the institutions, though it can be read both ways - yes, the European Council makes the nomination taking into account the election results (which aren't binding), but the Parliament also "elects" the Commission and Commission President. Those making the argument that the European Council should be free to ignore the election results (or at least the Spitzenkandidaten) argue that the Parliament is making a power-grab here.
Well, the Parliament is making a power-grab. But it's not an illegal one. Through its power of election (and it's power to remove a sitting Commission), the European Parliament has an effective veto over the Commission. The European Council is, of course, free to nominate someone else, but the question being fought over right now is how much it can under the current system. The point is that the Parliament can reject any nominee that the European Council proposes, and this, along with the commitment of the big Europarties to rejecting non-Spitzenkandidaten, that is forcing the Council to deal with this issue in the first place.
There are two legal rules here, but it's the political coalitions that can be built across the Parliament and Council that will decide the issue in the end.
This would make the Commission political! The Commission should be the neutral "civil service" of the EU.
It's hard to see how you can argue that the Commission is politically neutral when the Member States have been sending politicians as Commissioners since the institution began. Jacques Delors was hardly a politically neutral figure. As the Commission has a near-monopoly on the right to propose new laws (some laws can be proposed in the Council), it can't help but be political. While the European Council sets the general direction of the EU, the Commission consults on and draws up the proposals, which have to be put to a vote of the Commissioners before they're proposed. And presumably those who oppose Juncker on the basis that he doesn't fit their political agenda think that the institution is political enough that it warrants a campaign.
The introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten will make the Commission more political, in that the Parliament - or at least the Europarties in the coalition - is likely to want to see a kind of "coalition programme", at least on the priorities of the Commission. I think we'll see something like this from the Grand Coalition in the Parliament, but I doubt it will be very detailed or will end up replacing the Council's script. The Council is still a very powerful co-legislator, and the Commission and Parliament will have to agree on them for any law to be passed.
This would make the Commission too dependent on the Parliament and destroy the institutional balance of the EU.
The Commission, Parliament and Council work together as a kind of institutional triangle: they have to work together to pass any EU laws. An argument against the Parliament having such influence over the choice for Commission President is that the Commission will become overly dependent on the Parliament for its political support and direction. As I mentioned above, the Council's support is needed in any case to pass laws, so I don't think this will have too much of an impact institutionally, but it could have the effect of making the EU a bit more majoritarian.
If there is a coalition programme, for example, the Commission might be motivated to propose a law based on the fact that has a majority in the Parliament. The Council could reject this, of course, but the public nature of the proposal makes the situation more complicated, since Member States might have to think more about their position on the proposal. Consultations with the Parliament and the Council before draft laws are proposed so I can't see anything radical being proposed - but proposals might be increasingly pitched on the understanding that there's a qualified majority in the Council rather than letting some ideas die off or never even be considered due to the opposition of one or two Member States.
An interesting argument could be had here on whether this would make national governments feel less in control of, and less likely to support, the EU while not generating enough democratic legitimacy for the Union to sustain itself without the full support of the elite of the 28 member governments. It's not really something that can be answered before it's been tried, but those supporting the move towards Spitzenkandidaten should be mindful that it's not a strategy without risk.
On the other hand, sticking with the current Council-dominated approach, which tends to favour bigger countries over the small ones, isn't without risk either. The economic crisis has largely been dealt with by the European Council through summits where clearly not all Member States are equal (you only need to think of Germany's dominance in the Eurocrisis). If bringing the Commission into line with the European elections makes the Commission more independent of the Member States and more able to treat them equally, this could be a reason to support the process.
Thursday, 12 June 2014
A very Cameronian blunder
Since the election the backing for Juncker as the European Commission President has stiffened, from Angela Merkel to even European Left candidate Tsipras saying that Juncker deserves to get the job if he can get a parliamentary backing, because that's the democratic, parliamentary process. Set against this, Cameron's campaign against a Juncker presidency looks more and more misguided by the day. While the Netherlands, Sweden and Hungary are against Juncker, by leading such a prominent campaign against him, Cameron has probably made it more likely that Juncker will get the presidency.
Cameron tends to have a very short-term, tactical approach to politics, particularly when it comes to the EU. The big speech that was supposed to outflank UKIP clearly didn't - in fact, the more the Conservative party echoes UKIP, the better UKIP seems to do. Promising a renegotiation and an in/out referendum on the basis of the result hasn't done much to quiet his party on the matter either (with people now wondering if the referendum date of 2017 will be brought forward to 2016). When wielding the veto in December 2011, Cameron was able to strike the pose of a decisive leader with good Euroskeptic credentials, but the ability of the other countries to go on without the UK ended up showing how devalued a veto can be. (If the UK had taken part in the negotiations while holding on to the veto, it would have been able to shape the agreement and it's potential veto would have carried more weight towards the end of the process). This short-termist thinking is often traced back to Cameron promising to take the Conservatives out of the EPP as part of his platform for the party leadership.
Opposing Juncker's candidacy was always going to be risky. While the campaign might not have been as high profile as some would have wanted, it's difficult to name alternatives from outside the Europarty candidates - Lagarde has ruled herself out, and many of the others are serving Prime Ministers and Presidents. Pascal Lamy, director-general of WTO and formerly the chef de cabinet of Jacques Delors, is hardly a fresher name than Juncker when it comes to EU politics. More importantly, the European Parliament is set on getting one of its candidates in the job, and they can veto any nomination by the European Council. It's difficult to see any of these speculative alternatives giving up their jobs (or present themselves as willing to give up their premierships/presidencies to their national electorates), to place themselves in the middle of a power struggle between the Parliament and the Council.
And while the UK has some allies on its side, it's going to be very difficult to form a blocking minority in the European Council. Cameron's view on EU politics seems strikingly simplistic - focused on winning over Merkel and co-opting Germany's political weight in Europe. It's hardly a secret that Merkel is lukewarm on a Juncker presidency, but the German media rallied behind Juncker when it was suggested that the UK may be threatening leaving the EU. That the CDU's coalition partners in Berlin, the Social Democrats, were so closely wedded to the presidential campaign meant that the pressure on Merkel to publicly back Juncker was strong within the government too. Rather than working to quietly sideline Juncker behind the scenes, Cameron has made it much harder to get rid of him by forcing public declarations of support or opposition.
All this raises the question: if it's this difficult to block Juncker, how much influence would the UK have in shaping the alternative? A nomination still requires a majority. Even if Italy joins the UK in blocking Juncker (a big if, in my opinion, as Italy will soon have the presidency of the Council for the second half of 2014 and will probably want good relations with the Parliament if it wants to push legislation through), will the blocking minority form a coherent enough bloc vote to be able to shift the rest of the Member States (and for the UK to have a decisive role in that)?
Cameron would probably have done better by quickly getting the European Council to adopt priorities that are closer to his position using the election results as political support. The European Council still sets the overall policy direction of the Union (and Merkel has tried to steer the debate in this direction as a way of finding consensus). But now a Juncker presidency will have been badly burned by the right-wing, British-led, opposition to him, and he will be aware that his political base in the Parliament rests on a coalition with left-wing parties who were needed in order to overcome ECR opposition and any EPP rebellions. The institutional balance and Juncker's own affinity for fellow national leaders will mean that his presidency will focus more on consensus rather than confrontation, but it will be far from a natural ally of the current UK government.
Cameron tends to have a very short-term, tactical approach to politics, particularly when it comes to the EU. The big speech that was supposed to outflank UKIP clearly didn't - in fact, the more the Conservative party echoes UKIP, the better UKIP seems to do. Promising a renegotiation and an in/out referendum on the basis of the result hasn't done much to quiet his party on the matter either (with people now wondering if the referendum date of 2017 will be brought forward to 2016). When wielding the veto in December 2011, Cameron was able to strike the pose of a decisive leader with good Euroskeptic credentials, but the ability of the other countries to go on without the UK ended up showing how devalued a veto can be. (If the UK had taken part in the negotiations while holding on to the veto, it would have been able to shape the agreement and it's potential veto would have carried more weight towards the end of the process). This short-termist thinking is often traced back to Cameron promising to take the Conservatives out of the EPP as part of his platform for the party leadership.
Opposing Juncker's candidacy was always going to be risky. While the campaign might not have been as high profile as some would have wanted, it's difficult to name alternatives from outside the Europarty candidates - Lagarde has ruled herself out, and many of the others are serving Prime Ministers and Presidents. Pascal Lamy, director-general of WTO and formerly the chef de cabinet of Jacques Delors, is hardly a fresher name than Juncker when it comes to EU politics. More importantly, the European Parliament is set on getting one of its candidates in the job, and they can veto any nomination by the European Council. It's difficult to see any of these speculative alternatives giving up their jobs (or present themselves as willing to give up their premierships/presidencies to their national electorates), to place themselves in the middle of a power struggle between the Parliament and the Council.
And while the UK has some allies on its side, it's going to be very difficult to form a blocking minority in the European Council. Cameron's view on EU politics seems strikingly simplistic - focused on winning over Merkel and co-opting Germany's political weight in Europe. It's hardly a secret that Merkel is lukewarm on a Juncker presidency, but the German media rallied behind Juncker when it was suggested that the UK may be threatening leaving the EU. That the CDU's coalition partners in Berlin, the Social Democrats, were so closely wedded to the presidential campaign meant that the pressure on Merkel to publicly back Juncker was strong within the government too. Rather than working to quietly sideline Juncker behind the scenes, Cameron has made it much harder to get rid of him by forcing public declarations of support or opposition.
All this raises the question: if it's this difficult to block Juncker, how much influence would the UK have in shaping the alternative? A nomination still requires a majority. Even if Italy joins the UK in blocking Juncker (a big if, in my opinion, as Italy will soon have the presidency of the Council for the second half of 2014 and will probably want good relations with the Parliament if it wants to push legislation through), will the blocking minority form a coherent enough bloc vote to be able to shift the rest of the Member States (and for the UK to have a decisive role in that)?
Cameron would probably have done better by quickly getting the European Council to adopt priorities that are closer to his position using the election results as political support. The European Council still sets the overall policy direction of the Union (and Merkel has tried to steer the debate in this direction as a way of finding consensus). But now a Juncker presidency will have been badly burned by the right-wing, British-led, opposition to him, and he will be aware that his political base in the Parliament rests on a coalition with left-wing parties who were needed in order to overcome ECR opposition and any EPP rebellions. The institutional balance and Juncker's own affinity for fellow national leaders will mean that his presidency will focus more on consensus rather than confrontation, but it will be far from a natural ally of the current UK government.
Thursday, 29 May 2014
Presidential Race: Juncker's Battle for the Berlaymont
The EPP may have won a plurality of seats in the European Parliament, but Jean-Claude Juncker, its candidate for Commission President, hasn't got the job yet. His Social Democrat rival, Martin Schulz, was reluctant to concede (and has not actually completely given up yet), but the numbers in the Parliament mean that Juncker is far more likely to form a stable majority. That's not the end of the story - several Prime Ministers and national delegations oppose his candidacy, so now there could be a stand-off between the European Parliament and the European Council.
Supporters and Opponents
The PES has recognised Juncker's right to the first attempt at finding a parliamentary majority. The seat numbers have changed a little since my first thoughts on the results on Monday, but essentially a Grand Coalition between EPP and PES (around 405 seats) would provide the most stable coalition with a workable majority. However, some national delegations of the EPP, such as Orban's Fidesz, are against Juncker's candidacy, and since the vote on a Presidential nominee is by secret ballot, it's not clear how cohesive a coalition would be in practice. It may be that the Liberals and Greens need to be added to the coalition to ensure there's a majority that can endure a prolonged struggle with the European Council.
David Cameron quickly came out against Juncker. Though Juncker is a centre-right candidate, Cameron calculates that he is too federalist to have in the Commission during his planned renegotiation. It's not clear who Cameron would find acceptable in the job. Two of the other possibilities that are subject to speculation are Christine Lagarde and Pascal Lamy, though I can't see them being arch-supporters of a repatriation programme. Juncker's supposed federalism may be overstated a bit: he's definitely for the status quo insofar as he backs the current treaties and had a hand in how the Eurozone has been reformed so far, but I think he's more of an intergovernmental pro-European - he's very close to the European Council, having sat in it for many years.
Without an alternative, it's questionable whether Cameron's opposition will actually pay off meaningfully for him. On Newsnight it was said that the UK's ability to block Juncker would be a test of Cameron's influence and ability to renegotiate, but at the moment the reward side of this risk is vague at best. (Remember, the European Council makes it nomination by Qualified Majority). Angela Merkel appears to have cooled on Juncker's candidacy (not that she was ever a fan of giving the Parliament the decision over the job - despite the CDU's manifesto pledge that the Commission President become a directly elected post). To act against your party's successful candidate is an odd political decision, especially given the head-to-head debates between Schulz and Juncker on German TV.
Juncker should get the job
The European Parliament has to stand behind Juncker if it wants the elections to be as important as they claimed during the campaign. Agreeing a compromise candidate with the European Council would discredit the Parliament and make the next elections more difficult. After all, the EPP won the most seats, not the Euroskeptics, and for the winning party's candidate to be dumped by the Council now would send a signal for next time to the voters: there's no point paying any attention to the candidates - or even the election - we'll just strike a deal afterwards.
Far from a Juncker Presidency playing into Euroskeptics' hands or ignoring the voters, it would underline the importance of the vote and respect the outcome and the resulting parliamentary arithmetic. Which is why the commentary on the Tagesschau today rightly pointed out that placating Cameron by ignoring the voters is a stupid political decision.
Supporters and Opponents
The PES has recognised Juncker's right to the first attempt at finding a parliamentary majority. The seat numbers have changed a little since my first thoughts on the results on Monday, but essentially a Grand Coalition between EPP and PES (around 405 seats) would provide the most stable coalition with a workable majority. However, some national delegations of the EPP, such as Orban's Fidesz, are against Juncker's candidacy, and since the vote on a Presidential nominee is by secret ballot, it's not clear how cohesive a coalition would be in practice. It may be that the Liberals and Greens need to be added to the coalition to ensure there's a majority that can endure a prolonged struggle with the European Council.
David Cameron quickly came out against Juncker. Though Juncker is a centre-right candidate, Cameron calculates that he is too federalist to have in the Commission during his planned renegotiation. It's not clear who Cameron would find acceptable in the job. Two of the other possibilities that are subject to speculation are Christine Lagarde and Pascal Lamy, though I can't see them being arch-supporters of a repatriation programme. Juncker's supposed federalism may be overstated a bit: he's definitely for the status quo insofar as he backs the current treaties and had a hand in how the Eurozone has been reformed so far, but I think he's more of an intergovernmental pro-European - he's very close to the European Council, having sat in it for many years.
Without an alternative, it's questionable whether Cameron's opposition will actually pay off meaningfully for him. On Newsnight it was said that the UK's ability to block Juncker would be a test of Cameron's influence and ability to renegotiate, but at the moment the reward side of this risk is vague at best. (Remember, the European Council makes it nomination by Qualified Majority). Angela Merkel appears to have cooled on Juncker's candidacy (not that she was ever a fan of giving the Parliament the decision over the job - despite the CDU's manifesto pledge that the Commission President become a directly elected post). To act against your party's successful candidate is an odd political decision, especially given the head-to-head debates between Schulz and Juncker on German TV.
Juncker should get the job
The European Parliament has to stand behind Juncker if it wants the elections to be as important as they claimed during the campaign. Agreeing a compromise candidate with the European Council would discredit the Parliament and make the next elections more difficult. After all, the EPP won the most seats, not the Euroskeptics, and for the winning party's candidate to be dumped by the Council now would send a signal for next time to the voters: there's no point paying any attention to the candidates - or even the election - we'll just strike a deal afterwards.
Far from a Juncker Presidency playing into Euroskeptics' hands or ignoring the voters, it would underline the importance of the vote and respect the outcome and the resulting parliamentary arithmetic. Which is why the commentary on the Tagesschau today rightly pointed out that placating Cameron by ignoring the voters is a stupid political decision.
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