Yesterday the European Parliament elected the EPP Spitzenkandidat to the office of Commission President, putting the seal on the shift in power between the European Council and the Parliament. In his speech before his election, Juncker set out his political guidelines for the next Commission. Titled A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change (PDF), it's a pitch for the support of his social democrat allies while sending some signals to the right on subsidiarity and "welfare tourism". The coalition pact worked - not that it was ever in any doubt - delivering 422 votes where 376 would do, giving Juncker a majority of 46.
Juncker's "New Start" gives us a new political benchmark for judging the Commission - having set the goals such as coming up with a Jobs, Growth and Investment Package within the first 3 months of his Commission, the Commission President can now be judged by his own platform. This should breathe new life into the Commission, which under Barroso has largely been reactive to the ideas of the European Council. It also makes Parliament's scrutiny of the Commission more meaningful since the political programme is based on Juncker's majority - parliamentary attacks on legislation and the Commission itself for not delivering will be a lot more meaningful where the Commission isn't simply acting as the middle man for the European Council.
So what's in this New Start?
On the economy, Juncker has stressed the need to cut debt and to stick to the Stability Pact, while looking for more investment from the European Investment Bank. It remains to be seen how much the "Jobs, Growth and Investment Package" can actually deliver, but the PES should be happy that Juncker will continue backing for the Youth Guarantee, a big campaign for them over the last 2 years. Juncker has also pledged action on the digital single market within 6 months of his mandate: on data protection negotiations, reforming telecom rules and copyright rules and simplifying the rules for online consumers. Copyright is a particularly contentious issue after SOPA in the US and ACTA in the EU, so this could be an area to watch in the future.
On industrial policy, Juncker's headline goal is for industry to make up 20% of the European economy by 2020 (up from under 16%), though there is little here by way of concrete proposals yet, and it sounds like the measures envisaged are very indirect. Juncker has put forward the idea of a Capital Markets Union to complement the Banking Union and help cut the costs for raising money on the capital markets for SMEs. When it comes to the Eurozone and future "bail-outs", it's out with the trioka and in with "social impact assessments" to complement the "fiscal sustainability assessment" - a big issue for the PES.
The trade pact with the US was a big issue in the debates, and Juncker is still a big backer of it, though he has spoken about protecting European standards. Potentially the biggest change here could be the increasing parliamentary involvement in trade negotiations if Juncker lives up to his promise of more transparency on the negotiations.
On home affairs, there will be a Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, and Juncker is calling for a Directive to combat Discrimination. There will also be a Commissioner for Migration. The "Blue Card" legislation on immigration into Europe will be reviewed, and the new Commission will look into the support the European Asylum Support Office can offer Member States and third countries. Finally Juncker showed strong support for increasing the budget of the border agency FRONTEX. Perhaps linked to concerns over migration, Juncker has said that there won't be further enlargement of the Union for another 5 years - though it's unlikely that there would be much chance of a candidate country joining in the next 5 years in any case.
Politically the rhetoric has shifted leftwards, but I think the programme is still fairly centre-right. Gone are the earlier musings on a band of European minimum wages, though Juncker supports each Member States having a minimum wage, and it is hard to see how the talk on investment will really be translated into tangible action (there is a history of European politicians pinning their hopes on the European Investment Bank to fund their plans in the absence of a sizable EU budget). And while the debt-cutting targets or mechanisms may be softened or bought under more democratic control, the rules will remain in place.
Much of the programme is still a wish-list and we still have to wait to see what the Commission actually proposes (remember, the Parliament still has to grill and vote in the next Commission over the coming months before they can get down to work), but it represents a big departure from the old State of the European Union speeches that Barroso gave. Barroso's speeches where a fairly reliable guide to the legislative proposals the Commission would make, but where usually originally a Council idea or only put forward where the Commission felt that the Council would find a proposal acceptable. This programme, and probably future Juncker speeches, will probably be more significant for not merely being a list of legislation, but part of a political programme: some legislation won't make it, but it's also an opportunity to shape the EU agenda.
This is not to say that the programme, along with yesterday's speech, is earth-shattering or even if it's the right list of policies, but the political Commission is back. And that's a good thing.
Showing posts with label Jean-Claude Junker. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jean-Claude Junker. Show all posts
Wednesday, 16 July 2014
Friday, 27 June 2014
The European Council votes: Cameron's Last Stand
The European Council will vote today on the nominee for Commission President. One month of political wrangling on from the elections, it's now certain that Jean-Claude Junker, EPP candidate, will get the nomination because of his majority in the European Parliament. Despite this, Cameron wants an official vote in the European Council rather than concede to consensus in return for some concessions.
What does Cameron get out of this? It may be a principled stand, and it also plays well to the domestic audience to not be seen giving any concessions or backing down (particularly with his backbenchers in the UK Parliament) - indeed Cameron has made this such a personal crusade that it's practically impossible for him to back down now. However, it's not likely to help Cameron's position on Europe for long: just as the 2011 veto failed to change anything and did little to help boost the Conservatives against UKIP, and being outvoted around the Council table is unlikely to inspire confidence in the plan for renegotiation.
The sight of the Swedish and Dutch governments ditching the anti-Juncker alliance also undermines the idea of some type of Northern European Alliance that the UK can be a part of, and even if it did stick together, whether it would be strong enough to push successfully for change. That's not to say that the UK couldn't build such an alliance, or that those countries don't really support (some) of the UK's aims, but the way the UK conducts its diplomacy means that the current "alliance" is really only skin-deep. At the moment Britain seems to identify countries that have a few of the same grumbles and tries to band together just on that issue - but since the EU is basically a series of endless negotiations, in an alliance you need to have strong links over several issues (otherwise allies are less likely to stick their necks out for each other). Without greater coherence and a longer-term attention, the UK becomes less useful to its allies, leading to a weaker alliance. Cameron's blundering anti-Juncker campaign has probably soured some relations and made it more difficult to get allies.
The vote might have another legacy by cracking the history of decisions by consensus. How will this filter into the decisions over other posts? In the short term we'll see a return to consensus as governments fear being isolated by a damaging vote, but the threat of a vote will increasingly hang over the Council table, where even a big country can be outvoted. There may not be more voting, but the European Council may become more majoritarian in character.
After Juncker is nominated and elected Commission President, it will be interesting to see how he will react to Britain's goals (and what job the UK's Commissioner will get!). Cameron has definitely burned all bridges there, but Juncker will still have to react to the increased Euroskeptic representation in the Parliament and the persistent left-wing discontent on the Eurozone. Getting into office is probably the easy part.
What does Cameron get out of this? It may be a principled stand, and it also plays well to the domestic audience to not be seen giving any concessions or backing down (particularly with his backbenchers in the UK Parliament) - indeed Cameron has made this such a personal crusade that it's practically impossible for him to back down now. However, it's not likely to help Cameron's position on Europe for long: just as the 2011 veto failed to change anything and did little to help boost the Conservatives against UKIP, and being outvoted around the Council table is unlikely to inspire confidence in the plan for renegotiation.
The sight of the Swedish and Dutch governments ditching the anti-Juncker alliance also undermines the idea of some type of Northern European Alliance that the UK can be a part of, and even if it did stick together, whether it would be strong enough to push successfully for change. That's not to say that the UK couldn't build such an alliance, or that those countries don't really support (some) of the UK's aims, but the way the UK conducts its diplomacy means that the current "alliance" is really only skin-deep. At the moment Britain seems to identify countries that have a few of the same grumbles and tries to band together just on that issue - but since the EU is basically a series of endless negotiations, in an alliance you need to have strong links over several issues (otherwise allies are less likely to stick their necks out for each other). Without greater coherence and a longer-term attention, the UK becomes less useful to its allies, leading to a weaker alliance. Cameron's blundering anti-Juncker campaign has probably soured some relations and made it more difficult to get allies.
The vote might have another legacy by cracking the history of decisions by consensus. How will this filter into the decisions over other posts? In the short term we'll see a return to consensus as governments fear being isolated by a damaging vote, but the threat of a vote will increasingly hang over the Council table, where even a big country can be outvoted. There may not be more voting, but the European Council may become more majoritarian in character.
After Juncker is nominated and elected Commission President, it will be interesting to see how he will react to Britain's goals (and what job the UK's Commissioner will get!). Cameron has definitely burned all bridges there, but Juncker will still have to react to the increased Euroskeptic representation in the Parliament and the persistent left-wing discontent on the Eurozone. Getting into office is probably the easy part.
Thursday, 12 June 2014
A very Cameronian blunder
Since the election the backing for Juncker as the European Commission President has stiffened, from Angela Merkel to even European Left candidate Tsipras saying that Juncker deserves to get the job if he can get a parliamentary backing, because that's the democratic, parliamentary process. Set against this, Cameron's campaign against a Juncker presidency looks more and more misguided by the day. While the Netherlands, Sweden and Hungary are against Juncker, by leading such a prominent campaign against him, Cameron has probably made it more likely that Juncker will get the presidency.
Cameron tends to have a very short-term, tactical approach to politics, particularly when it comes to the EU. The big speech that was supposed to outflank UKIP clearly didn't - in fact, the more the Conservative party echoes UKIP, the better UKIP seems to do. Promising a renegotiation and an in/out referendum on the basis of the result hasn't done much to quiet his party on the matter either (with people now wondering if the referendum date of 2017 will be brought forward to 2016). When wielding the veto in December 2011, Cameron was able to strike the pose of a decisive leader with good Euroskeptic credentials, but the ability of the other countries to go on without the UK ended up showing how devalued a veto can be. (If the UK had taken part in the negotiations while holding on to the veto, it would have been able to shape the agreement and it's potential veto would have carried more weight towards the end of the process). This short-termist thinking is often traced back to Cameron promising to take the Conservatives out of the EPP as part of his platform for the party leadership.
Opposing Juncker's candidacy was always going to be risky. While the campaign might not have been as high profile as some would have wanted, it's difficult to name alternatives from outside the Europarty candidates - Lagarde has ruled herself out, and many of the others are serving Prime Ministers and Presidents. Pascal Lamy, director-general of WTO and formerly the chef de cabinet of Jacques Delors, is hardly a fresher name than Juncker when it comes to EU politics. More importantly, the European Parliament is set on getting one of its candidates in the job, and they can veto any nomination by the European Council. It's difficult to see any of these speculative alternatives giving up their jobs (or present themselves as willing to give up their premierships/presidencies to their national electorates), to place themselves in the middle of a power struggle between the Parliament and the Council.
And while the UK has some allies on its side, it's going to be very difficult to form a blocking minority in the European Council. Cameron's view on EU politics seems strikingly simplistic - focused on winning over Merkel and co-opting Germany's political weight in Europe. It's hardly a secret that Merkel is lukewarm on a Juncker presidency, but the German media rallied behind Juncker when it was suggested that the UK may be threatening leaving the EU. That the CDU's coalition partners in Berlin, the Social Democrats, were so closely wedded to the presidential campaign meant that the pressure on Merkel to publicly back Juncker was strong within the government too. Rather than working to quietly sideline Juncker behind the scenes, Cameron has made it much harder to get rid of him by forcing public declarations of support or opposition.
All this raises the question: if it's this difficult to block Juncker, how much influence would the UK have in shaping the alternative? A nomination still requires a majority. Even if Italy joins the UK in blocking Juncker (a big if, in my opinion, as Italy will soon have the presidency of the Council for the second half of 2014 and will probably want good relations with the Parliament if it wants to push legislation through), will the blocking minority form a coherent enough bloc vote to be able to shift the rest of the Member States (and for the UK to have a decisive role in that)?
Cameron would probably have done better by quickly getting the European Council to adopt priorities that are closer to his position using the election results as political support. The European Council still sets the overall policy direction of the Union (and Merkel has tried to steer the debate in this direction as a way of finding consensus). But now a Juncker presidency will have been badly burned by the right-wing, British-led, opposition to him, and he will be aware that his political base in the Parliament rests on a coalition with left-wing parties who were needed in order to overcome ECR opposition and any EPP rebellions. The institutional balance and Juncker's own affinity for fellow national leaders will mean that his presidency will focus more on consensus rather than confrontation, but it will be far from a natural ally of the current UK government.
Cameron tends to have a very short-term, tactical approach to politics, particularly when it comes to the EU. The big speech that was supposed to outflank UKIP clearly didn't - in fact, the more the Conservative party echoes UKIP, the better UKIP seems to do. Promising a renegotiation and an in/out referendum on the basis of the result hasn't done much to quiet his party on the matter either (with people now wondering if the referendum date of 2017 will be brought forward to 2016). When wielding the veto in December 2011, Cameron was able to strike the pose of a decisive leader with good Euroskeptic credentials, but the ability of the other countries to go on without the UK ended up showing how devalued a veto can be. (If the UK had taken part in the negotiations while holding on to the veto, it would have been able to shape the agreement and it's potential veto would have carried more weight towards the end of the process). This short-termist thinking is often traced back to Cameron promising to take the Conservatives out of the EPP as part of his platform for the party leadership.
Opposing Juncker's candidacy was always going to be risky. While the campaign might not have been as high profile as some would have wanted, it's difficult to name alternatives from outside the Europarty candidates - Lagarde has ruled herself out, and many of the others are serving Prime Ministers and Presidents. Pascal Lamy, director-general of WTO and formerly the chef de cabinet of Jacques Delors, is hardly a fresher name than Juncker when it comes to EU politics. More importantly, the European Parliament is set on getting one of its candidates in the job, and they can veto any nomination by the European Council. It's difficult to see any of these speculative alternatives giving up their jobs (or present themselves as willing to give up their premierships/presidencies to their national electorates), to place themselves in the middle of a power struggle between the Parliament and the Council.
And while the UK has some allies on its side, it's going to be very difficult to form a blocking minority in the European Council. Cameron's view on EU politics seems strikingly simplistic - focused on winning over Merkel and co-opting Germany's political weight in Europe. It's hardly a secret that Merkel is lukewarm on a Juncker presidency, but the German media rallied behind Juncker when it was suggested that the UK may be threatening leaving the EU. That the CDU's coalition partners in Berlin, the Social Democrats, were so closely wedded to the presidential campaign meant that the pressure on Merkel to publicly back Juncker was strong within the government too. Rather than working to quietly sideline Juncker behind the scenes, Cameron has made it much harder to get rid of him by forcing public declarations of support or opposition.
All this raises the question: if it's this difficult to block Juncker, how much influence would the UK have in shaping the alternative? A nomination still requires a majority. Even if Italy joins the UK in blocking Juncker (a big if, in my opinion, as Italy will soon have the presidency of the Council for the second half of 2014 and will probably want good relations with the Parliament if it wants to push legislation through), will the blocking minority form a coherent enough bloc vote to be able to shift the rest of the Member States (and for the UK to have a decisive role in that)?
Cameron would probably have done better by quickly getting the European Council to adopt priorities that are closer to his position using the election results as political support. The European Council still sets the overall policy direction of the Union (and Merkel has tried to steer the debate in this direction as a way of finding consensus). But now a Juncker presidency will have been badly burned by the right-wing, British-led, opposition to him, and he will be aware that his political base in the Parliament rests on a coalition with left-wing parties who were needed in order to overcome ECR opposition and any EPP rebellions. The institutional balance and Juncker's own affinity for fellow national leaders will mean that his presidency will focus more on consensus rather than confrontation, but it will be far from a natural ally of the current UK government.
Thursday, 29 May 2014
Presidential Race: Juncker's Battle for the Berlaymont
The EPP may have won a plurality of seats in the European Parliament, but Jean-Claude Juncker, its candidate for Commission President, hasn't got the job yet. His Social Democrat rival, Martin Schulz, was reluctant to concede (and has not actually completely given up yet), but the numbers in the Parliament mean that Juncker is far more likely to form a stable majority. That's not the end of the story - several Prime Ministers and national delegations oppose his candidacy, so now there could be a stand-off between the European Parliament and the European Council.
Supporters and Opponents
The PES has recognised Juncker's right to the first attempt at finding a parliamentary majority. The seat numbers have changed a little since my first thoughts on the results on Monday, but essentially a Grand Coalition between EPP and PES (around 405 seats) would provide the most stable coalition with a workable majority. However, some national delegations of the EPP, such as Orban's Fidesz, are against Juncker's candidacy, and since the vote on a Presidential nominee is by secret ballot, it's not clear how cohesive a coalition would be in practice. It may be that the Liberals and Greens need to be added to the coalition to ensure there's a majority that can endure a prolonged struggle with the European Council.
David Cameron quickly came out against Juncker. Though Juncker is a centre-right candidate, Cameron calculates that he is too federalist to have in the Commission during his planned renegotiation. It's not clear who Cameron would find acceptable in the job. Two of the other possibilities that are subject to speculation are Christine Lagarde and Pascal Lamy, though I can't see them being arch-supporters of a repatriation programme. Juncker's supposed federalism may be overstated a bit: he's definitely for the status quo insofar as he backs the current treaties and had a hand in how the Eurozone has been reformed so far, but I think he's more of an intergovernmental pro-European - he's very close to the European Council, having sat in it for many years.
Without an alternative, it's questionable whether Cameron's opposition will actually pay off meaningfully for him. On Newsnight it was said that the UK's ability to block Juncker would be a test of Cameron's influence and ability to renegotiate, but at the moment the reward side of this risk is vague at best. (Remember, the European Council makes it nomination by Qualified Majority). Angela Merkel appears to have cooled on Juncker's candidacy (not that she was ever a fan of giving the Parliament the decision over the job - despite the CDU's manifesto pledge that the Commission President become a directly elected post). To act against your party's successful candidate is an odd political decision, especially given the head-to-head debates between Schulz and Juncker on German TV.
Juncker should get the job
The European Parliament has to stand behind Juncker if it wants the elections to be as important as they claimed during the campaign. Agreeing a compromise candidate with the European Council would discredit the Parliament and make the next elections more difficult. After all, the EPP won the most seats, not the Euroskeptics, and for the winning party's candidate to be dumped by the Council now would send a signal for next time to the voters: there's no point paying any attention to the candidates - or even the election - we'll just strike a deal afterwards.
Far from a Juncker Presidency playing into Euroskeptics' hands or ignoring the voters, it would underline the importance of the vote and respect the outcome and the resulting parliamentary arithmetic. Which is why the commentary on the Tagesschau today rightly pointed out that placating Cameron by ignoring the voters is a stupid political decision.
Supporters and Opponents
The PES has recognised Juncker's right to the first attempt at finding a parliamentary majority. The seat numbers have changed a little since my first thoughts on the results on Monday, but essentially a Grand Coalition between EPP and PES (around 405 seats) would provide the most stable coalition with a workable majority. However, some national delegations of the EPP, such as Orban's Fidesz, are against Juncker's candidacy, and since the vote on a Presidential nominee is by secret ballot, it's not clear how cohesive a coalition would be in practice. It may be that the Liberals and Greens need to be added to the coalition to ensure there's a majority that can endure a prolonged struggle with the European Council.
David Cameron quickly came out against Juncker. Though Juncker is a centre-right candidate, Cameron calculates that he is too federalist to have in the Commission during his planned renegotiation. It's not clear who Cameron would find acceptable in the job. Two of the other possibilities that are subject to speculation are Christine Lagarde and Pascal Lamy, though I can't see them being arch-supporters of a repatriation programme. Juncker's supposed federalism may be overstated a bit: he's definitely for the status quo insofar as he backs the current treaties and had a hand in how the Eurozone has been reformed so far, but I think he's more of an intergovernmental pro-European - he's very close to the European Council, having sat in it for many years.
Without an alternative, it's questionable whether Cameron's opposition will actually pay off meaningfully for him. On Newsnight it was said that the UK's ability to block Juncker would be a test of Cameron's influence and ability to renegotiate, but at the moment the reward side of this risk is vague at best. (Remember, the European Council makes it nomination by Qualified Majority). Angela Merkel appears to have cooled on Juncker's candidacy (not that she was ever a fan of giving the Parliament the decision over the job - despite the CDU's manifesto pledge that the Commission President become a directly elected post). To act against your party's successful candidate is an odd political decision, especially given the head-to-head debates between Schulz and Juncker on German TV.
Juncker should get the job
The European Parliament has to stand behind Juncker if it wants the elections to be as important as they claimed during the campaign. Agreeing a compromise candidate with the European Council would discredit the Parliament and make the next elections more difficult. After all, the EPP won the most seats, not the Euroskeptics, and for the winning party's candidate to be dumped by the Council now would send a signal for next time to the voters: there's no point paying any attention to the candidates - or even the election - we'll just strike a deal afterwards.
Far from a Juncker Presidency playing into Euroskeptics' hands or ignoring the voters, it would underline the importance of the vote and respect the outcome and the resulting parliamentary arithmetic. Which is why the commentary on the Tagesschau today rightly pointed out that placating Cameron by ignoring the voters is a stupid political decision.
Monday, 26 May 2014
European Elections 2014: First Thoughts
The votes are not in yet, but is seems that the exit polls are giving us a fair idea of what the next European Parliament will look like:
EPP: 212
S&D Group (PES): 185
ALDE: 71
Greens: 55
ECR Group: 40
UEL: 45
EFD: 36
Others (New parties not yet part of a group): 67
The biggest gain for the far right were in France (Front national), Denmark (the Danish People's Party), and Hungary (Jobbik). The fact that the Front national, the Danish People's Party and UKIP topped the polls nationally shows a bug leap forward for Euroskepticism. (Denmark appears to have voted in favour of a European Patent Court in a referendum yesterday, however). This isn't so much a problem for the workings of the European Parliament - after all the vast majority of people voted for pro-European, or at least pro-status quo, parties - but it will put pressure on some groups, particularly the EPP, to take a more Euroskeptic or "Eurorealist" approach.
With the bloc of "others/NI" it will be interesting to see how the groups on the right deal with the new entrants: will the ECR and/or the EFD attract these new entrants. UKIP (EFD) has ruled out working with the Front national, but the Front national has ruled out working with Jobbik or Golden Dawn, so it's still not clear how this new "NI" bloc will work in practice.
On the Presidential race, it looks like the EPP has won and Juncker will have the first opportunity to form a majority in Parliament. The language has changed slightly here, in a predictable way, from a straight presidential race to a more prime ministerial one: the biggest party has the first chance to form a majority, and then the next one, and so on. The difference here is that the candidates probably need an outright win plus a majority to convince the European Council to give way to the European Parliament on the issue of who leads the Commission - something that the EUCO isn't happy to let go of.
Schulz hasn't given up on his hopes of getting the job, though it's become far less likely in practice. The election of a Commission President requires an absolute majority of the Parliament, which is 376. EPP + ECR + ALDE = 323; S&D + ALDE + Greens = 311; and S&D + EPP = 397. While these numbers aren't final, it's clear that a left or right-wing bloc would struggle to command a majority in the Parliament (and that's before you take into account that some MEPs might not vote along the party line since they vote by secret ballot).
There is speculation that there will be a compromise candidate from outside the Europarty candidates - such as Christine Lagarde or Pascal Lamy. The European Parliament should avoid falling into this trap and agree on voting for one of the candidates that ran. Based on these numbers, I don't think it's possible for Schulz to take the post, but perhaps Juncker could be made Commission President and the PES can control some key DGs of the Commission. This would be more in line with the parliamentary nature of the system, but the European Council will strongly resist parliamentary influence over the Commission.
In the coming days and weeks the announcements and spin from the Juncker camp and the various heads of government will reveal the direction of travel here: how much does Juncker really want the job, and if he's bought off with the Presidency of the European Council, would Schulz be able to insert himself into the Commission (unlikely)? Will the Council try to force a compromise candidate on the Parliament? Finally, the politicking of the Europarties will matter a lot: if they don't find a way to hang together as a majority coalition (while maximising their various interests), then the European Parliament will lose its battle to make the Commission more democratically accountable to it, and it will make it extremely difficult to build on the idea that the EP elections can be the equivalent of a government-changing election at the European level.
MEPs should try to remember in the coming months that their own influence and relevance will be dependent on how they fight their next political battle.
EPP: 212
S&D Group (PES): 185
ALDE: 71
Greens: 55
ECR Group: 40
UEL: 45
EFD: 36
Others (New parties not yet part of a group): 67
The biggest gain for the far right were in France (Front national), Denmark (the Danish People's Party), and Hungary (Jobbik). The fact that the Front national, the Danish People's Party and UKIP topped the polls nationally shows a bug leap forward for Euroskepticism. (Denmark appears to have voted in favour of a European Patent Court in a referendum yesterday, however). This isn't so much a problem for the workings of the European Parliament - after all the vast majority of people voted for pro-European, or at least pro-status quo, parties - but it will put pressure on some groups, particularly the EPP, to take a more Euroskeptic or "Eurorealist" approach.
With the bloc of "others/NI" it will be interesting to see how the groups on the right deal with the new entrants: will the ECR and/or the EFD attract these new entrants. UKIP (EFD) has ruled out working with the Front national, but the Front national has ruled out working with Jobbik or Golden Dawn, so it's still not clear how this new "NI" bloc will work in practice.
On the Presidential race, it looks like the EPP has won and Juncker will have the first opportunity to form a majority in Parliament. The language has changed slightly here, in a predictable way, from a straight presidential race to a more prime ministerial one: the biggest party has the first chance to form a majority, and then the next one, and so on. The difference here is that the candidates probably need an outright win plus a majority to convince the European Council to give way to the European Parliament on the issue of who leads the Commission - something that the EUCO isn't happy to let go of.
Schulz hasn't given up on his hopes of getting the job, though it's become far less likely in practice. The election of a Commission President requires an absolute majority of the Parliament, which is 376. EPP + ECR + ALDE = 323; S&D + ALDE + Greens = 311; and S&D + EPP = 397. While these numbers aren't final, it's clear that a left or right-wing bloc would struggle to command a majority in the Parliament (and that's before you take into account that some MEPs might not vote along the party line since they vote by secret ballot).
There is speculation that there will be a compromise candidate from outside the Europarty candidates - such as Christine Lagarde or Pascal Lamy. The European Parliament should avoid falling into this trap and agree on voting for one of the candidates that ran. Based on these numbers, I don't think it's possible for Schulz to take the post, but perhaps Juncker could be made Commission President and the PES can control some key DGs of the Commission. This would be more in line with the parliamentary nature of the system, but the European Council will strongly resist parliamentary influence over the Commission.
In the coming days and weeks the announcements and spin from the Juncker camp and the various heads of government will reveal the direction of travel here: how much does Juncker really want the job, and if he's bought off with the Presidency of the European Council, would Schulz be able to insert himself into the Commission (unlikely)? Will the Council try to force a compromise candidate on the Parliament? Finally, the politicking of the Europarties will matter a lot: if they don't find a way to hang together as a majority coalition (while maximising their various interests), then the European Parliament will lose its battle to make the Commission more democratically accountable to it, and it will make it extremely difficult to build on the idea that the EP elections can be the equivalent of a government-changing election at the European level.
MEPs should try to remember in the coming months that their own influence and relevance will be dependent on how they fight their next political battle.
Tuesday, 20 May 2014
Why vote for the European People's Party? - the EPP Manifesto
The centre-right European People's Party is one of the big two Europarties (alongside the centre-left Party of European Socialists), and their candidate for the Commission Presidency, Jean-Claude Juncker, has a chance of becoming the next Commission President. So what's in their manifesto? There isn't much of a manifesto on the EPP's own website (you can read about its stance on several policy areas here and they have a party platform from 2012 (PDF)), but there is a manifesto on Juncker's website - helpfully titled "Why vote for the European People's Party?"
The EPP has been the largest party in the European Parliament for the last 5 years and has been the biggest party in the Council (most of the Member States' (senior) governing parties were EPP members) and the Commission. In their manifesto they promote themselves as the responsible party of government that is willing to take tough choices. Unsurprisingly, they support continuing a lot of the current economic and fiscal policies of the Eurozone and talk of fiscal discipline. The EPP calls for structural reforms to encourage investment in new industries and condemns socialists as wanting to spend "other people's money".
The EPP supports an EU energy market and wants more investment in low carbon technologies. On free movement of people, the EPP remains a supporter, while on immigration the EPP talks about the need for stronger integration. Better co-operation on policing the Schengen common border is also an issue. They want a single market in digital services (as I go through the manifestos this is becoming a bit of a running theme), and states its commitment to data protection as a fundamental right.
On foreign policy and the EU's neighbourhood, the EPP thinks that the Member States can become more effective by acting together and stress the need to support democracy in Eastern Europe.
All in all the manifesto seems to be a "mother's apple pie" manifesto - a lot of the aspirations are vague and most of the statements and proposals aren't very controversial (not that there's anything concrete). The strongest themes are those of fiscal discipline and immigration, which is where the Europarty most distinguishes itself from the others.
So if you support the current policy of fiscal discipline in the Eurozone and want better common border controls, the EPP might be the party for you.
The EPP has been the largest party in the European Parliament for the last 5 years and has been the biggest party in the Council (most of the Member States' (senior) governing parties were EPP members) and the Commission. In their manifesto they promote themselves as the responsible party of government that is willing to take tough choices. Unsurprisingly, they support continuing a lot of the current economic and fiscal policies of the Eurozone and talk of fiscal discipline. The EPP calls for structural reforms to encourage investment in new industries and condemns socialists as wanting to spend "other people's money".
The EPP supports an EU energy market and wants more investment in low carbon technologies. On free movement of people, the EPP remains a supporter, while on immigration the EPP talks about the need for stronger integration. Better co-operation on policing the Schengen common border is also an issue. They want a single market in digital services (as I go through the manifestos this is becoming a bit of a running theme), and states its commitment to data protection as a fundamental right.
On foreign policy and the EU's neighbourhood, the EPP thinks that the Member States can become more effective by acting together and stress the need to support democracy in Eastern Europe.
All in all the manifesto seems to be a "mother's apple pie" manifesto - a lot of the aspirations are vague and most of the statements and proposals aren't very controversial (not that there's anything concrete). The strongest themes are those of fiscal discipline and immigration, which is where the Europarty most distinguishes itself from the others.
So if you support the current policy of fiscal discipline in the Eurozone and want better common border controls, the EPP might be the party for you.
Friday, 16 May 2014
Election 2014: The Debate
The headline debate run by the European Broadcasting Union (of Eurovision Song Contest fame) brought together the 5 candidates running in the contest to become the President of the Commission. With the Commission disparaged for not being democratic enough, this election should give voters a say over who heads the Commission and how the EU will be run for the next 5 years. The idea is that the nomination of the Commission President by the European Council (heads of state and government) has to take into account the outcome of the elections, and the European Parliament elects the Commission, so the Parliament should be able to push a majority-wielding and election-winning candidate through.
The candidates of the 5 European political parties who decided to nominate candidates met to fight it out on the airwaves (or should that be air-bits, now that everything's digital?), with the debate being broadcast at 9pm CET yesterday. Martin Schulz (for the centre-left Party of European Socialists), Jean-Claude Juncker (for the centre-right European People's Party), Ska Keller (for the European Greens), Guy Verhofstadt (for the Liberals), and Alexis Tsipras (for the European United Left)* had a minute each to answer questions on jobs and the economy, the situation in Ukraine, separatism, immigration, religious freedom, and voter apathy.
In many ways the debate was hobbled: for a start, some of the questions could have easily been replaced with much better and more relevant ones. Talking about voter apathy, for instance, has never got people excited to vote. It's strange that questions weren't used to find out were candidates stood on the Common Agricultural Policy, on justice and home affairs or Eurobonds. The 1 minute time limit for the candidates to speak is an obvious block on a deep debate, but understandable when there is only one debate on this scale with all the candidates. In the future, it would be better to have 2 or 3 debates on more focused topics with more room for interaction between the candidates.
That said, the debate was in some ways better than I thought it would be: there were some good performances, with Guy Verhofstadt and Ska Keller speaking well. While it was frustrating that there was little debate on policy or a good knock-out blow, the I think the debate did show the candidates off and revealed a bit about their style (as much as anything can for 5 people over just 90 minutes). So what did it tell us about the candidates?
Guy Verhofstadt (Liberals):
Verhofstadt was probably the best performer on the night. He took a very clear pro-integration stance, and drew nearly all of his arguments back to it. On the economy and jobs, he said that further market integration, especially in new areas like the digital economy, would spur growth and create jobs. On immigration, having a common policy would help by giving a legal pathway to immigration. And returning to national currencies would hurt ordinary people the most, so the Euro should be integrated better to make it work better. He was definitely the most aggressive (and kind of odd) - he attacked Tsipras for its links with Greek public banks and read out a letter from Gary Kasparov.
While Verhofstadt was one of the winners of this debate, his lack of policy content was a big downside for me. Big, common policies sound dramatic and grand, but I still don't have any idea about what those policies could do - or even what they'd look like. The US and Australia may have federal immigration systems, but should the EU have one (and would it be points based, etc.?). I still have too many unanswered questions.
Ska Keller (Greens):
Keller was, with Verhofstadt, one of the better speakers and she came across well, making some great interventions on the Transatlantic Trade Pact (criticising the secrecy of negotiations), and she even made an attack on Schulz for not doing more to fight against corruption in the institutions. As a Green, she highlighted green jobs and industry as the economic solution and pointed out that energy independence would strengthen the EU's position when it came to Russia.
Sadly she didn't mention any policy ideas: in many ways her positions are exactly what you would imagine as a German Green. It's a strong brand, but without throwing some interesting ideas and policies out there, it probably won't make much of an impact. Keller could draw more voters to the Green banner in places where there isn't such a well developed Green party.
Alexis Tsipras (EUL):
Tsipras had a few good moments in challenging the austerity policy and calling for a tougher approach on tax evasion, etc. As the leader of the opposition in Greece (and therefore the most high-profile EUL leader across Europe), Tsipras used his time to attack the policies of the past 5 years and challenged Juncker on what the heads of government got up to behind closed doors when the Greek and Italian governments were replaced by technocratic governments (Juncker was a long-serving Prime Minister of Luxembourg).
Unfortunately, Tsipras never really moved beyond the blame game towards even sketching out what he would do as Commission President. A forum for proper and fairer discussion is not really a policy. With a few good populist left-wing policies, Tsipras could have put pressure on Schulz, who was tacking more towards the centre. Instead, Tsipras was oddly irrelevant to the debate.
Martin Schulz (PES):
Schulz performed competently, but had a few halting and ponderous speeches. He was the only candidate who came within the vicinity of proposing a policy! - a micro-financing initiative to help small and medium businesses grow and create jobs. Schulz talked tough on tax evasion and avoidance, but didn't set out a vision for the Eurozone (merely noting that the banking union was a step in the right direction but more needed to be done). Given the left's criticism of austerity and the Eurozone's budget rules, it's disappointing that Schulz didn't present more of an alternative on this front.
Indeed, Schulz appeared to soften his federalism and left-wing edges in order to appeal to more centrist voters. Schulz took pains to advocate not More Europe, but Another Europe, and tried to give a statesmanlike answer on the question of relations with Russia. The more ponderous nature of his speeches may have been to project as more competent and dependable appearance - his speeches can be quite passionate in German - but a bit more fire would have been nice.
Jean-Claude Juncker (EPP):
The dullest candidate. There's no getting away from it: Juncker was incredibly dull and it's hard to remember much of what he said at all. Very much advocating the status quo on practically everything, Juncker represents the "stay-the-course-and-listen-to-the-Council" approach. He defended the policies of the last 5 years as someone who was at the heart of the EU and the Eurozone as Luxembourg's Prime Minister. Juncker struck a tone more in favour of Member States' rights and subsidiarity, and when asked about whether or not the Commission President could be picked from outside of the candidates, he steered towards the legal text of the treaties. He was the only one that came closest to giving us a debate gaff when he said that the banks were now well behaved, but nobody really picked up on this (perhaps because Juncker was often the last to speak on a topic).
It may be that Juncker is aiming to replace Van Rompuy as the President of the European Council, where he can continue to sit with Prime Ministers and Presidents, than take Barroso's job leading the Commission. The EPP are not well served by Juncker.
To get to know where the Europarties stand, we'll have to dig deeper and look at their manifestos. But hopefully this debate raised the profile of the elections and the possible pan-European debate that can be had. We now have our chance to decide who becomes the next boss of all those "unelected bureaucrats": let's take it.
*The Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists (with which the UK Conservatives are aligned) and the Euroskeptic parties did not put a candidate forward.
The candidates of the 5 European political parties who decided to nominate candidates met to fight it out on the airwaves (or should that be air-bits, now that everything's digital?), with the debate being broadcast at 9pm CET yesterday. Martin Schulz (for the centre-left Party of European Socialists), Jean-Claude Juncker (for the centre-right European People's Party), Ska Keller (for the European Greens), Guy Verhofstadt (for the Liberals), and Alexis Tsipras (for the European United Left)* had a minute each to answer questions on jobs and the economy, the situation in Ukraine, separatism, immigration, religious freedom, and voter apathy.
In many ways the debate was hobbled: for a start, some of the questions could have easily been replaced with much better and more relevant ones. Talking about voter apathy, for instance, has never got people excited to vote. It's strange that questions weren't used to find out were candidates stood on the Common Agricultural Policy, on justice and home affairs or Eurobonds. The 1 minute time limit for the candidates to speak is an obvious block on a deep debate, but understandable when there is only one debate on this scale with all the candidates. In the future, it would be better to have 2 or 3 debates on more focused topics with more room for interaction between the candidates.
That said, the debate was in some ways better than I thought it would be: there were some good performances, with Guy Verhofstadt and Ska Keller speaking well. While it was frustrating that there was little debate on policy or a good knock-out blow, the I think the debate did show the candidates off and revealed a bit about their style (as much as anything can for 5 people over just 90 minutes). So what did it tell us about the candidates?
Guy Verhofstadt (Liberals):
Verhofstadt was probably the best performer on the night. He took a very clear pro-integration stance, and drew nearly all of his arguments back to it. On the economy and jobs, he said that further market integration, especially in new areas like the digital economy, would spur growth and create jobs. On immigration, having a common policy would help by giving a legal pathway to immigration. And returning to national currencies would hurt ordinary people the most, so the Euro should be integrated better to make it work better. He was definitely the most aggressive (and kind of odd) - he attacked Tsipras for its links with Greek public banks and read out a letter from Gary Kasparov.
While Verhofstadt was one of the winners of this debate, his lack of policy content was a big downside for me. Big, common policies sound dramatic and grand, but I still don't have any idea about what those policies could do - or even what they'd look like. The US and Australia may have federal immigration systems, but should the EU have one (and would it be points based, etc.?). I still have too many unanswered questions.
Ska Keller (Greens):
Keller was, with Verhofstadt, one of the better speakers and she came across well, making some great interventions on the Transatlantic Trade Pact (criticising the secrecy of negotiations), and she even made an attack on Schulz for not doing more to fight against corruption in the institutions. As a Green, she highlighted green jobs and industry as the economic solution and pointed out that energy independence would strengthen the EU's position when it came to Russia.
Sadly she didn't mention any policy ideas: in many ways her positions are exactly what you would imagine as a German Green. It's a strong brand, but without throwing some interesting ideas and policies out there, it probably won't make much of an impact. Keller could draw more voters to the Green banner in places where there isn't such a well developed Green party.
Alexis Tsipras (EUL):
Tsipras had a few good moments in challenging the austerity policy and calling for a tougher approach on tax evasion, etc. As the leader of the opposition in Greece (and therefore the most high-profile EUL leader across Europe), Tsipras used his time to attack the policies of the past 5 years and challenged Juncker on what the heads of government got up to behind closed doors when the Greek and Italian governments were replaced by technocratic governments (Juncker was a long-serving Prime Minister of Luxembourg).
Unfortunately, Tsipras never really moved beyond the blame game towards even sketching out what he would do as Commission President. A forum for proper and fairer discussion is not really a policy. With a few good populist left-wing policies, Tsipras could have put pressure on Schulz, who was tacking more towards the centre. Instead, Tsipras was oddly irrelevant to the debate.
Martin Schulz (PES):
Schulz performed competently, but had a few halting and ponderous speeches. He was the only candidate who came within the vicinity of proposing a policy! - a micro-financing initiative to help small and medium businesses grow and create jobs. Schulz talked tough on tax evasion and avoidance, but didn't set out a vision for the Eurozone (merely noting that the banking union was a step in the right direction but more needed to be done). Given the left's criticism of austerity and the Eurozone's budget rules, it's disappointing that Schulz didn't present more of an alternative on this front.
Indeed, Schulz appeared to soften his federalism and left-wing edges in order to appeal to more centrist voters. Schulz took pains to advocate not More Europe, but Another Europe, and tried to give a statesmanlike answer on the question of relations with Russia. The more ponderous nature of his speeches may have been to project as more competent and dependable appearance - his speeches can be quite passionate in German - but a bit more fire would have been nice.
Jean-Claude Juncker (EPP):
The dullest candidate. There's no getting away from it: Juncker was incredibly dull and it's hard to remember much of what he said at all. Very much advocating the status quo on practically everything, Juncker represents the "stay-the-course-and-listen-to-the-Council" approach. He defended the policies of the last 5 years as someone who was at the heart of the EU and the Eurozone as Luxembourg's Prime Minister. Juncker struck a tone more in favour of Member States' rights and subsidiarity, and when asked about whether or not the Commission President could be picked from outside of the candidates, he steered towards the legal text of the treaties. He was the only one that came closest to giving us a debate gaff when he said that the banks were now well behaved, but nobody really picked up on this (perhaps because Juncker was often the last to speak on a topic).
It may be that Juncker is aiming to replace Van Rompuy as the President of the European Council, where he can continue to sit with Prime Ministers and Presidents, than take Barroso's job leading the Commission. The EPP are not well served by Juncker.
To get to know where the Europarties stand, we'll have to dig deeper and look at their manifestos. But hopefully this debate raised the profile of the elections and the possible pan-European debate that can be had. We now have our chance to decide who becomes the next boss of all those "unelected bureaucrats": let's take it.
*The Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists (with which the UK Conservatives are aligned) and the Euroskeptic parties did not put a candidate forward.
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