Worries over the free movement of people have grown into a huge political issue in the EU, with the idea that EU citizens are using their free movement rights to sponge off the welfare states of other Member States becoming more widespread. The panic is particularly pronounced in the UK, where David Cameron has announced changes that will "put the Britain first" by reducing the time EU citizens can claim benefits in the UK without realistic job prospects from six to three months. (So this will put the UK first on benefit claims for those without realistic job prospects?).
The rhetoric over the UK's supposed "magnetic pull" is now deeply ingrained, and hasn't exactly been informed by sober comparisons of the relative generosity of the British welfare system versus other Member States (there's no league table of European magnetism). Strangely, there was an article in the right-leaning Telegraph about how thousands of Britons were claiming unemployment benefits in Germany. And when we look at what the change in the law will mean for benefit claims, the BBC reckons that the change will only affect roughly 10,000 people.
This is a small number - which amounts to around 1% of all jobseekers benefit claimants - but apparently a big enough policy for the Prime Minister to announce it. Indeed, the numbers of EU citizens claiming benefits while not working are tiny across the EU. But the pressure to be seen to be tough on immigration and on the free movement of people is building in many countries, leading to many of the centre-right (and centre-left) parties to adopt tough language on immigration and welfare to win back support from voters who have voted for populist parties. The danger is that this political grandstanding legitimises the politics of populist parties while not winning back support as the measures introduced by the mainstream parties have no obvious effect. The small numbers affected by welfare changes will be read in this political climate as showing the weakness of the mainstream parties, rather than demonstrating that, in reality, the numbers that move just to benefit from the welfare system (rather than actually looking for work), are just that small.
Clearly it's easier to bang the welfare tourism drum and toughen welfare laws than to stand up for the free movement of people - ministers prefer to be able to say "ah, but we have been tackling the problem" rather than be called out of touch for standing up for the free movement of people or arguing for policies to actually improve public services. But it feeds the anti-immigration climate and paints mainstream parties into a corner. When people discover (or "feel") that the policies aren't having any effect, they will lose faith in the ability of the mainstream parties and shift their support to the populists.
Focusing on creating jobs and making the economy work for all is a much harder task but it should be the business of the mainstream parties. It's when they give in to the allure of easy political grandstanding that they fritter away their credibility on a game with the populists that they cannot win.
Wednesday, 13 August 2014
Tuesday, 12 August 2014
EU-Canada FTA and Investor-State Dispute Settlement
The EU-Canada Trade Agreement has been finalised after German concerns over possible investor-state dispute settlement provisions were satisfied. The treaty still has to be passed by the EU and the Member States, so it's not a done deal yet (apparently the ratification process could continue to 2016), but the treaty is already being described as a model for the EU-US trade deal (or "TTIP").
Investor-State dispute settlement is a mechanism that allows foreign investors to sue host governments in special arbitration tribunals. Such provisions have been included in trade agreements in the past and have come under fire for allowing foreign businesses to litigate against environmental and public health regulations created by host governments - a way for private business to subvert democratically framed laws. This has been the most controversial issue when it comes to the TTIP, raising concerns that European standards will be eroded.
Reportedly Germany protested against the use of investor-state dispute settlement being a part of the Canadian treaty, and even threatened to veto the deal, but Canadian officials state that the disagreement was actually sorted out a while ago, without needing to re-negotiate the treaty. So it's unclear how far the treaty was actually changed, or whether there will still be ISDS provisions in the treaty. The fact that the treaty won't be public before September means that it's hard to welcome this as a victory for standing up against ISDS. (If the ISDS provisions have been removed, then it will show up Trade Commissioner de Gucht's rhetoric over how necessary they are for investor confidence to be waffle).
The treaty probably will be a model for the negotiations to come for the TTIP, not only due to similar issues that need to be thrashed out, but also because this will be a test case for public and parliamentary opinion in Europe. How will the European and national parliaments react - and will the public raise any concerns? The fact that this could be one of the early tests for the European Parliament could make it even more interesting.
Investor-State dispute settlement is a mechanism that allows foreign investors to sue host governments in special arbitration tribunals. Such provisions have been included in trade agreements in the past and have come under fire for allowing foreign businesses to litigate against environmental and public health regulations created by host governments - a way for private business to subvert democratically framed laws. This has been the most controversial issue when it comes to the TTIP, raising concerns that European standards will be eroded.
Reportedly Germany protested against the use of investor-state dispute settlement being a part of the Canadian treaty, and even threatened to veto the deal, but Canadian officials state that the disagreement was actually sorted out a while ago, without needing to re-negotiate the treaty. So it's unclear how far the treaty was actually changed, or whether there will still be ISDS provisions in the treaty. The fact that the treaty won't be public before September means that it's hard to welcome this as a victory for standing up against ISDS. (If the ISDS provisions have been removed, then it will show up Trade Commissioner de Gucht's rhetoric over how necessary they are for investor confidence to be waffle).
The treaty probably will be a model for the negotiations to come for the TTIP, not only due to similar issues that need to be thrashed out, but also because this will be a test case for public and parliamentary opinion in Europe. How will the European and national parliaments react - and will the public raise any concerns? The fact that this could be one of the early tests for the European Parliament could make it even more interesting.
Monday, 11 August 2014
Independence or Devolution?
Last week saw the first TV debate between Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond and Alistair Darling the leader of the pro-Union "Better Together" campaign in the run up to the referendum on Scottish independence. Salmond is known across the UK for being a shrewd politician and a great debater, whereas Darling, a former Chancellor, is seen as competent and dependable, but dull. So much was made of Darling's victory in the debate (according to the snap polls immediately afterwards), particularly with the Yes (pro-independence) side behind in the polls.
Darling won the debate largely because the independence campaign has stuck to a highly optimistic view of the transition to independence, so in a debate it comes across as if the Yes side aren't taking the concerns of the No side seriously (hardly a way to woo swing voters with similar concerns). And there are issues with the transition to independence: EU membership won't be automatic (though it hardly be a complicated process for a country that already complies with EU law), and creating a suitable currency union between Scotland and the rest of the UK will doubtless be a complicated task.
But the real question is whether Scotland is not only different to the rest of the UK (read: England), but different enough that full independence is necessary to properly express that difference. From education to healthcare, there's no denying that Scotland is more social democratic than the rest of the UK (though it may just be more in line with the rest of Europe than England), and the political gulf between Edinburgh and London can be seen in the lack of Tories North of the border. But does devolution (with more powers to be shifted from London to Edinburgh in the event of a No vote) not enable Scotland to give voice to those politics while also retaining the benefits of union? The fact that the independence plan would keep so much of the union, from the monarch to the currency, suggests that the "best of both worlds" argument might have some attraction yet.
Looking at how the debate has played in Westminster and how the main UK parties have dealt with it, I can see it only being a matter of time before Scotland leaves. More devolution to Scotland is great, but the asymmetric nature of the union is a big problem for its future survival. Without any debate about what the union should be about and how it should work together apart from occasional devolution to the constituent nations, the union ends up on the wrong side of history. The momentum will stay with Scotland's drift towards independence, and the central institutions of the UK will not be reformed to reflect how the UK is developing. The UK needs to stop acting like a unitary state - really, the UK should take a federal approach to empower English regions as well as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, re-balancing the UK away from London and the South-East and making devolution and union part of the same political narrative.
That's not going to happen. England famously doesn't like to debate constitutional reform, trusting in a flexible, "unwritten" constitution (which underestimates the danger of bumbling through decisions and undervalues the virtue of democratically facing up to such decisions rather than leaving them to a cosy elite to sort out amongst themselves). A political atmosphere where the union is increasingly an English space that the Celtic fringe gets exemptions from is not a union of equals and this leaves very little in the way of common institutions or political narrative to justify sticking together.
Scotland's social democratic vision is a very attractive one - it's one that it can achieve as an independent country, and probably also as part of the UK. Independence will give Scotland something more indefinable than what Salmond promises: the freedom to reflect on, debate and shape itself. The real weakness of the UK may not be that it isn't giving Scotland the tools that it needs to forge its own path while staying inside the union, it's that it struggles to be about more than the London-centric Westminster bubble.
Darling won the debate largely because the independence campaign has stuck to a highly optimistic view of the transition to independence, so in a debate it comes across as if the Yes side aren't taking the concerns of the No side seriously (hardly a way to woo swing voters with similar concerns). And there are issues with the transition to independence: EU membership won't be automatic (though it hardly be a complicated process for a country that already complies with EU law), and creating a suitable currency union between Scotland and the rest of the UK will doubtless be a complicated task.
But the real question is whether Scotland is not only different to the rest of the UK (read: England), but different enough that full independence is necessary to properly express that difference. From education to healthcare, there's no denying that Scotland is more social democratic than the rest of the UK (though it may just be more in line with the rest of Europe than England), and the political gulf between Edinburgh and London can be seen in the lack of Tories North of the border. But does devolution (with more powers to be shifted from London to Edinburgh in the event of a No vote) not enable Scotland to give voice to those politics while also retaining the benefits of union? The fact that the independence plan would keep so much of the union, from the monarch to the currency, suggests that the "best of both worlds" argument might have some attraction yet.
Looking at how the debate has played in Westminster and how the main UK parties have dealt with it, I can see it only being a matter of time before Scotland leaves. More devolution to Scotland is great, but the asymmetric nature of the union is a big problem for its future survival. Without any debate about what the union should be about and how it should work together apart from occasional devolution to the constituent nations, the union ends up on the wrong side of history. The momentum will stay with Scotland's drift towards independence, and the central institutions of the UK will not be reformed to reflect how the UK is developing. The UK needs to stop acting like a unitary state - really, the UK should take a federal approach to empower English regions as well as Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, re-balancing the UK away from London and the South-East and making devolution and union part of the same political narrative.
That's not going to happen. England famously doesn't like to debate constitutional reform, trusting in a flexible, "unwritten" constitution (which underestimates the danger of bumbling through decisions and undervalues the virtue of democratically facing up to such decisions rather than leaving them to a cosy elite to sort out amongst themselves). A political atmosphere where the union is increasingly an English space that the Celtic fringe gets exemptions from is not a union of equals and this leaves very little in the way of common institutions or political narrative to justify sticking together.
Scotland's social democratic vision is a very attractive one - it's one that it can achieve as an independent country, and probably also as part of the UK. Independence will give Scotland something more indefinable than what Salmond promises: the freedom to reflect on, debate and shape itself. The real weakness of the UK may not be that it isn't giving Scotland the tools that it needs to forge its own path while staying inside the union, it's that it struggles to be about more than the London-centric Westminster bubble.
Friday, 18 July 2014
A role for national parliaments: giving substance to subsidiarity
Giving power to national parliaments is a common theme of EU reform. Expanding the power of the European Parliament, it's argued, has failed as can be seen from declining turnout. I don't buy the turnout theory, largely for the reasons Jon Worth has argued over at the LSE blog: there hasn't been a link between the European elections and the policy direction of the EU, never mind the people who run it, making the influence of the EP and the importance of the elections rather nebulous - and hardly exciting for citizens. It wasn't until Juncker was elected Commission President by the EP on the basis of the Spitzenkandidaten and election campaigns that the elections showed their true value, and we have to wait until the next election to see if the Europarty primaries and the campaigns generally come under greater scrutiny for their policy platforms.
The low turnout argument has led to some arguing that the EP should be replaced by the original assembly of national parliamentarians, or that there should be an upper chamber of national parliamentarians. But this wouldn't increase the legitimacy of the EU. The idea that national MPs would return home to discuss European decisions that have no bearing on their re-election clearly has no traction. Frankly, the hope here is that national MPs will socialise themselves into being more pro-European and this will tone down the anti-EU rhetoric at home - but European decisions are too political now not to have a direct democratic input. This is no solution for boosting EU legitimacy.
What about giving the national parliaments a red card power to block EU legislation? This idea has more merit, but to me it's coming at the question from the wrong angle. A system where you can block a lot, but where it's hard to make any decisions that are effective or that people can be happy with loses legitimacy simply by not working very well. By contrast, simple and direct democratic controls would give citizens a more direct route to the EU - compare the old way of picking the Commission President. Technically, it's still there - there's an election, the European Council considers the outcome and nominates a candidate that the European Parliament votes on. How is any voter going to engage in the elections based on that? But now that the winning candidate (with a majority in the Parliament) will be elected, it's a lot simpler and potentially more engaging.
It's the same with a blocking vote for national parliaments - it could prevent unpopular legislation, but it could also block solution-finding and decision-making so much that voters can't see how they can influence any outcome that they actually want. Which is why there needs to be a democratic European forum for European decisions.
But that doesn't mean that the national parliaments shouldn't have a bigger role at a European level. By building on the Yellow Card process, real substance could be given to subsidiarity. What decisions should be taken at what level is a political question that can't really be decided judicially, so it's up to national parliaments to help define what should be done at the national and European levels. But as Kosmopolito points out, the Yellow Card process is hardly used.
Maybe what the national parliaments need is a stronger institutional link with the EU. If they had an equivalent of the Committee of the Regions that could collate the views of national parliaments and give a joint opinion on legislation, and act as a secretariat that could help national parliaments use their Yellow Card powers more effectively. This could replace the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC), which is still a bit too informal to give the national parliaments the institutional support they need at the European level, and use IPEX as a basis. And by publishing joint opinions - or even a summary of the different opinions of national parliaments - this could give a more accessible expression of the different national positions and to the general parliamentary feeling on subsidiarity.
Of course, Member States could go further themselves and use the same system as the Danish parliament to scrutinise national ministers in the Council and give them clear mandates, but that's unlikely to be a popular idea among national governments...
The low turnout argument has led to some arguing that the EP should be replaced by the original assembly of national parliamentarians, or that there should be an upper chamber of national parliamentarians. But this wouldn't increase the legitimacy of the EU. The idea that national MPs would return home to discuss European decisions that have no bearing on their re-election clearly has no traction. Frankly, the hope here is that national MPs will socialise themselves into being more pro-European and this will tone down the anti-EU rhetoric at home - but European decisions are too political now not to have a direct democratic input. This is no solution for boosting EU legitimacy.
What about giving the national parliaments a red card power to block EU legislation? This idea has more merit, but to me it's coming at the question from the wrong angle. A system where you can block a lot, but where it's hard to make any decisions that are effective or that people can be happy with loses legitimacy simply by not working very well. By contrast, simple and direct democratic controls would give citizens a more direct route to the EU - compare the old way of picking the Commission President. Technically, it's still there - there's an election, the European Council considers the outcome and nominates a candidate that the European Parliament votes on. How is any voter going to engage in the elections based on that? But now that the winning candidate (with a majority in the Parliament) will be elected, it's a lot simpler and potentially more engaging.
It's the same with a blocking vote for national parliaments - it could prevent unpopular legislation, but it could also block solution-finding and decision-making so much that voters can't see how they can influence any outcome that they actually want. Which is why there needs to be a democratic European forum for European decisions.
But that doesn't mean that the national parliaments shouldn't have a bigger role at a European level. By building on the Yellow Card process, real substance could be given to subsidiarity. What decisions should be taken at what level is a political question that can't really be decided judicially, so it's up to national parliaments to help define what should be done at the national and European levels. But as Kosmopolito points out, the Yellow Card process is hardly used.
Maybe what the national parliaments need is a stronger institutional link with the EU. If they had an equivalent of the Committee of the Regions that could collate the views of national parliaments and give a joint opinion on legislation, and act as a secretariat that could help national parliaments use their Yellow Card powers more effectively. This could replace the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC), which is still a bit too informal to give the national parliaments the institutional support they need at the European level, and use IPEX as a basis. And by publishing joint opinions - or even a summary of the different opinions of national parliaments - this could give a more accessible expression of the different national positions and to the general parliamentary feeling on subsidiarity.
Of course, Member States could go further themselves and use the same system as the Danish parliament to scrutinise national ministers in the Council and give them clear mandates, but that's unlikely to be a popular idea among national governments...
Thursday, 17 July 2014
The Great British Cabinet Reshuffle
David Cameron has reshuffled his government for the last year of the parliamentary term, giving us the ministerial faces that will fight the next election. Reshuffles in themselves are generally not a major event for the European political sphere - Ireland had a government reshuffle last week, which might be of more interest to those still pondering Juncker's question of how to get elected after running an austerity government - but the UK government reshuffle has attracted some comment over the perceived Euroskeptic shift.
The last of the old Tory Europhiles, Ken Clarke, and some of the more pragmatic ministers such as Dominic Grieve and even William Hague (he of the 10 Day to Save the Pound fame) are gone. In their place is the new class of 2010, who are generally younger and more ideological. Richard Hammond, the Euroskeptic Defence Minister who publicly indicated that he would vote Out in an EU referendum unless there is enough to the reform package, is now the Foreign Secretary. The reshuffle has sparked fear in some quarters that it marks a turn for the worst that could signal the start of moves to take the UK out of the European Convention on Human Rights.
But we shouldn't get over-excited. The main focus of the reshuffle is domestic, like all other reshuffles. Promoting the younger generation of Tories is more about making the ministerial benches more diverse and slightly more gender-balanced while harnessing their zeal for the campaign. In Michael Gove's case (the highly divisive Education Minister), there has been a surprising demotion to Chief Whip (to reports of teachers celebrating in classrooms). The new cabinet is more Euroskeptic, but the focus is on the next election rather than on a big bust-up with Europe.
The next Tory manifesto will be the real test for how far the Conservatives will go. If a pledge to withdraw from the ECHR makes it into it, then we can be sure that Cameron has thrown in the towel on pretending to have a moderate European course. Membership of the ECHR is fundamental to membership of the Council of Europe and the EU, and a pledge to withdraw would indicate that Cameron himself could campaign for an Out vote. Nominating Lord Hill to be the next UK Commissioner may be a pragmatic sign (he's reported to be relatively pro-EU), but the Liberal Democrats would have had a say in moderating the government choice, so it's not exactly a clear signal. Hill is also an unknown figure with little obvious connection to a Commission portfolio, making it harder for the UK to get a good post (or harder for Juncker to reconcile with Cameron!), which could add to the narrative of Britain being sidelined in the EU.
In any case, the big fights will come after the next election, when a new cabinet would have to be formed. This reshuffle may be a Euroskeptic turn for the Conservatives, but it really doesn't tell us much new. Cameron's policy of appeasing the Euroskeptics has been heading this way for some time, and domestic political calculations are the biggest consideration here (Cameron is hardly famed for his long-termist thinking on Europe). It will be the next election manifesto that will be the true benchmark for how far Cameron is willing to go.
The last of the old Tory Europhiles, Ken Clarke, and some of the more pragmatic ministers such as Dominic Grieve and even William Hague (he of the 10 Day to Save the Pound fame) are gone. In their place is the new class of 2010, who are generally younger and more ideological. Richard Hammond, the Euroskeptic Defence Minister who publicly indicated that he would vote Out in an EU referendum unless there is enough to the reform package, is now the Foreign Secretary. The reshuffle has sparked fear in some quarters that it marks a turn for the worst that could signal the start of moves to take the UK out of the European Convention on Human Rights.
But we shouldn't get over-excited. The main focus of the reshuffle is domestic, like all other reshuffles. Promoting the younger generation of Tories is more about making the ministerial benches more diverse and slightly more gender-balanced while harnessing their zeal for the campaign. In Michael Gove's case (the highly divisive Education Minister), there has been a surprising demotion to Chief Whip (to reports of teachers celebrating in classrooms). The new cabinet is more Euroskeptic, but the focus is on the next election rather than on a big bust-up with Europe.
The next Tory manifesto will be the real test for how far the Conservatives will go. If a pledge to withdraw from the ECHR makes it into it, then we can be sure that Cameron has thrown in the towel on pretending to have a moderate European course. Membership of the ECHR is fundamental to membership of the Council of Europe and the EU, and a pledge to withdraw would indicate that Cameron himself could campaign for an Out vote. Nominating Lord Hill to be the next UK Commissioner may be a pragmatic sign (he's reported to be relatively pro-EU), but the Liberal Democrats would have had a say in moderating the government choice, so it's not exactly a clear signal. Hill is also an unknown figure with little obvious connection to a Commission portfolio, making it harder for the UK to get a good post (or harder for Juncker to reconcile with Cameron!), which could add to the narrative of Britain being sidelined in the EU.
In any case, the big fights will come after the next election, when a new cabinet would have to be formed. This reshuffle may be a Euroskeptic turn for the Conservatives, but it really doesn't tell us much new. Cameron's policy of appeasing the Euroskeptics has been heading this way for some time, and domestic political calculations are the biggest consideration here (Cameron is hardly famed for his long-termist thinking on Europe). It will be the next election manifesto that will be the true benchmark for how far Cameron is willing to go.
Wednesday, 16 July 2014
The Juncker Programme
Yesterday the European Parliament elected the EPP Spitzenkandidat to the office of Commission President, putting the seal on the shift in power between the European Council and the Parliament. In his speech before his election, Juncker set out his political guidelines for the next Commission. Titled A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change (PDF), it's a pitch for the support of his social democrat allies while sending some signals to the right on subsidiarity and "welfare tourism". The coalition pact worked - not that it was ever in any doubt - delivering 422 votes where 376 would do, giving Juncker a majority of 46.
Juncker's "New Start" gives us a new political benchmark for judging the Commission - having set the goals such as coming up with a Jobs, Growth and Investment Package within the first 3 months of his Commission, the Commission President can now be judged by his own platform. This should breathe new life into the Commission, which under Barroso has largely been reactive to the ideas of the European Council. It also makes Parliament's scrutiny of the Commission more meaningful since the political programme is based on Juncker's majority - parliamentary attacks on legislation and the Commission itself for not delivering will be a lot more meaningful where the Commission isn't simply acting as the middle man for the European Council.
So what's in this New Start?
On the economy, Juncker has stressed the need to cut debt and to stick to the Stability Pact, while looking for more investment from the European Investment Bank. It remains to be seen how much the "Jobs, Growth and Investment Package" can actually deliver, but the PES should be happy that Juncker will continue backing for the Youth Guarantee, a big campaign for them over the last 2 years. Juncker has also pledged action on the digital single market within 6 months of his mandate: on data protection negotiations, reforming telecom rules and copyright rules and simplifying the rules for online consumers. Copyright is a particularly contentious issue after SOPA in the US and ACTA in the EU, so this could be an area to watch in the future.
On industrial policy, Juncker's headline goal is for industry to make up 20% of the European economy by 2020 (up from under 16%), though there is little here by way of concrete proposals yet, and it sounds like the measures envisaged are very indirect. Juncker has put forward the idea of a Capital Markets Union to complement the Banking Union and help cut the costs for raising money on the capital markets for SMEs. When it comes to the Eurozone and future "bail-outs", it's out with the trioka and in with "social impact assessments" to complement the "fiscal sustainability assessment" - a big issue for the PES.
The trade pact with the US was a big issue in the debates, and Juncker is still a big backer of it, though he has spoken about protecting European standards. Potentially the biggest change here could be the increasing parliamentary involvement in trade negotiations if Juncker lives up to his promise of more transparency on the negotiations.
On home affairs, there will be a Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, and Juncker is calling for a Directive to combat Discrimination. There will also be a Commissioner for Migration. The "Blue Card" legislation on immigration into Europe will be reviewed, and the new Commission will look into the support the European Asylum Support Office can offer Member States and third countries. Finally Juncker showed strong support for increasing the budget of the border agency FRONTEX. Perhaps linked to concerns over migration, Juncker has said that there won't be further enlargement of the Union for another 5 years - though it's unlikely that there would be much chance of a candidate country joining in the next 5 years in any case.
Politically the rhetoric has shifted leftwards, but I think the programme is still fairly centre-right. Gone are the earlier musings on a band of European minimum wages, though Juncker supports each Member States having a minimum wage, and it is hard to see how the talk on investment will really be translated into tangible action (there is a history of European politicians pinning their hopes on the European Investment Bank to fund their plans in the absence of a sizable EU budget). And while the debt-cutting targets or mechanisms may be softened or bought under more democratic control, the rules will remain in place.
Much of the programme is still a wish-list and we still have to wait to see what the Commission actually proposes (remember, the Parliament still has to grill and vote in the next Commission over the coming months before they can get down to work), but it represents a big departure from the old State of the European Union speeches that Barroso gave. Barroso's speeches where a fairly reliable guide to the legislative proposals the Commission would make, but where usually originally a Council idea or only put forward where the Commission felt that the Council would find a proposal acceptable. This programme, and probably future Juncker speeches, will probably be more significant for not merely being a list of legislation, but part of a political programme: some legislation won't make it, but it's also an opportunity to shape the EU agenda.
This is not to say that the programme, along with yesterday's speech, is earth-shattering or even if it's the right list of policies, but the political Commission is back. And that's a good thing.
Juncker's "New Start" gives us a new political benchmark for judging the Commission - having set the goals such as coming up with a Jobs, Growth and Investment Package within the first 3 months of his Commission, the Commission President can now be judged by his own platform. This should breathe new life into the Commission, which under Barroso has largely been reactive to the ideas of the European Council. It also makes Parliament's scrutiny of the Commission more meaningful since the political programme is based on Juncker's majority - parliamentary attacks on legislation and the Commission itself for not delivering will be a lot more meaningful where the Commission isn't simply acting as the middle man for the European Council.
So what's in this New Start?
On the economy, Juncker has stressed the need to cut debt and to stick to the Stability Pact, while looking for more investment from the European Investment Bank. It remains to be seen how much the "Jobs, Growth and Investment Package" can actually deliver, but the PES should be happy that Juncker will continue backing for the Youth Guarantee, a big campaign for them over the last 2 years. Juncker has also pledged action on the digital single market within 6 months of his mandate: on data protection negotiations, reforming telecom rules and copyright rules and simplifying the rules for online consumers. Copyright is a particularly contentious issue after SOPA in the US and ACTA in the EU, so this could be an area to watch in the future.
On industrial policy, Juncker's headline goal is for industry to make up 20% of the European economy by 2020 (up from under 16%), though there is little here by way of concrete proposals yet, and it sounds like the measures envisaged are very indirect. Juncker has put forward the idea of a Capital Markets Union to complement the Banking Union and help cut the costs for raising money on the capital markets for SMEs. When it comes to the Eurozone and future "bail-outs", it's out with the trioka and in with "social impact assessments" to complement the "fiscal sustainability assessment" - a big issue for the PES.
The trade pact with the US was a big issue in the debates, and Juncker is still a big backer of it, though he has spoken about protecting European standards. Potentially the biggest change here could be the increasing parliamentary involvement in trade negotiations if Juncker lives up to his promise of more transparency on the negotiations.
On home affairs, there will be a Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, and Juncker is calling for a Directive to combat Discrimination. There will also be a Commissioner for Migration. The "Blue Card" legislation on immigration into Europe will be reviewed, and the new Commission will look into the support the European Asylum Support Office can offer Member States and third countries. Finally Juncker showed strong support for increasing the budget of the border agency FRONTEX. Perhaps linked to concerns over migration, Juncker has said that there won't be further enlargement of the Union for another 5 years - though it's unlikely that there would be much chance of a candidate country joining in the next 5 years in any case.
Politically the rhetoric has shifted leftwards, but I think the programme is still fairly centre-right. Gone are the earlier musings on a band of European minimum wages, though Juncker supports each Member States having a minimum wage, and it is hard to see how the talk on investment will really be translated into tangible action (there is a history of European politicians pinning their hopes on the European Investment Bank to fund their plans in the absence of a sizable EU budget). And while the debt-cutting targets or mechanisms may be softened or bought under more democratic control, the rules will remain in place.
Much of the programme is still a wish-list and we still have to wait to see what the Commission actually proposes (remember, the Parliament still has to grill and vote in the next Commission over the coming months before they can get down to work), but it represents a big departure from the old State of the European Union speeches that Barroso gave. Barroso's speeches where a fairly reliable guide to the legislative proposals the Commission would make, but where usually originally a Council idea or only put forward where the Commission felt that the Council would find a proposal acceptable. This programme, and probably future Juncker speeches, will probably be more significant for not merely being a list of legislation, but part of a political programme: some legislation won't make it, but it's also an opportunity to shape the EU agenda.
This is not to say that the programme, along with yesterday's speech, is earth-shattering or even if it's the right list of policies, but the political Commission is back. And that's a good thing.
Monday, 30 June 2014
Is the European Left riding high?
Coming second in the European elections was a very bad result for the centre-left across Europe: after years of austerity and the Eurocrisis, and the PES spurring the Spitzenkadidaten process, the S&D group in the Parliament are still 30 seats behind the EPP. However the need for a Grand Coalition to propel Juncker into office has provided an opening for the left, and, like the Grand Coalition in Germany, the essential status quo stance of the biggest party gives the junior partner greater scope for pushing its agenda.
This seems to be the case when it comes to important EU posts. With Juncker as Commission President, there is a domestic German deal to support Martin Schulz as Parliament president for another 2.5 years (with the EPP taking the post for the remaining half of the parliamentary term). Two of the front runners for President of the European Council and the High Representative are Helle Thorning-Schmidt (Danish PM) and Federica Mogherini (Italian Foreign Minister) - to the extent that the EPP are protesting that the PES can't have 3 of the top EU posts. Really, the PES would be wise to go for an economic post over the High Representative position: the presidency of the European Council will be important for negotiations over how the Eurozone will be run, while the PES hasn't a very strong position on European foreign policy (if one of Italy's priorities is immigration, then the Home Affairs Commissioner might be a better position to angle for).
Given the complexity of the EU system, any agreement on policy between the Member States would be hard to stick to, so it's important for the left to win offices that are relevant to their policy goals on the economy. This will be hard to do since it depends on the nominations from the Member States, the negotiations over posts, Juncker's own plans and how the candidates fair in the European Parliament vetting process. There's already plans to revisit the Eurozone budget rules and a deal to soften deficit reduction in return for reforms, so with Italy in the Council driving seat for the rest of the year it appears that the centre-left might have a window of opportunity to push for change.
In the end, however, the lack of agreement over the policy aims of the ECB or even on some form of Transfer Union will mean that the actual scope of opportunity is very narrow indeed. And the broader problems of the centre-left are deep: the fracturing of the old electoral coalition as the economy has become less industrialised, coupled with the decline of two-party politics in most Member States, has left centre-left parties in a difficult position. Uncertain about their domestic support and (to date) largely ineffectual in generating a public debate over a more socially minded Eurozone with greater fiscal firepower, any success over the next few month is in danger of being momentary.
The left in Europe still has a tough task to rebuild itself and shouldn't be seduced into believing that they're in a good position. Europe's centre-right may be more open to some centre-left ideas than you might think at first glance, and they could be well placed to continue capturing centrist and some soft centre-left votes. The centre-left needs to rediscover its voice and identity combined with a platform of reform if it wants to return a a vote - and power - winning force.
This seems to be the case when it comes to important EU posts. With Juncker as Commission President, there is a domestic German deal to support Martin Schulz as Parliament president for another 2.5 years (with the EPP taking the post for the remaining half of the parliamentary term). Two of the front runners for President of the European Council and the High Representative are Helle Thorning-Schmidt (Danish PM) and Federica Mogherini (Italian Foreign Minister) - to the extent that the EPP are protesting that the PES can't have 3 of the top EU posts. Really, the PES would be wise to go for an economic post over the High Representative position: the presidency of the European Council will be important for negotiations over how the Eurozone will be run, while the PES hasn't a very strong position on European foreign policy (if one of Italy's priorities is immigration, then the Home Affairs Commissioner might be a better position to angle for).
Given the complexity of the EU system, any agreement on policy between the Member States would be hard to stick to, so it's important for the left to win offices that are relevant to their policy goals on the economy. This will be hard to do since it depends on the nominations from the Member States, the negotiations over posts, Juncker's own plans and how the candidates fair in the European Parliament vetting process. There's already plans to revisit the Eurozone budget rules and a deal to soften deficit reduction in return for reforms, so with Italy in the Council driving seat for the rest of the year it appears that the centre-left might have a window of opportunity to push for change.
In the end, however, the lack of agreement over the policy aims of the ECB or even on some form of Transfer Union will mean that the actual scope of opportunity is very narrow indeed. And the broader problems of the centre-left are deep: the fracturing of the old electoral coalition as the economy has become less industrialised, coupled with the decline of two-party politics in most Member States, has left centre-left parties in a difficult position. Uncertain about their domestic support and (to date) largely ineffectual in generating a public debate over a more socially minded Eurozone with greater fiscal firepower, any success over the next few month is in danger of being momentary.
The left in Europe still has a tough task to rebuild itself and shouldn't be seduced into believing that they're in a good position. Europe's centre-right may be more open to some centre-left ideas than you might think at first glance, and they could be well placed to continue capturing centrist and some soft centre-left votes. The centre-left needs to rediscover its voice and identity combined with a platform of reform if it wants to return a a vote - and power - winning force.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)